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International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Security

ICAIS 2022: Artificial Intelligence and Security pp 500–512Cite as

Formal Verification of Security Protocols: ProVerif and Extensions

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13339))

Abstract

Secure protocols are built on cryptographic algorithms, which provide a variety of secure services to realize secure communications in a network environment. To improve the quality of security protocols and ensure their reliability, sufficient verification and testing are required. ProVerif is a classic formal verification tool for security protocols, and we describe its working mechanism and verification process in detail. In this paper, we focus on ProVerif and extensions in the verification of security protocols. We introduce some representative solutions to illustrate verification with ProVerif. And we also introduce its extension tools for protocols with stateful properties, protocols with algebraic properties, and protocol implementations, then summarize the general method of ProVerif extension tools. Finally, we discuss possible future research points, including the extension of ProVerif for protocols that combined stateful and algebraic properties, verification of security applications in SDN networks, and building models from protocol implementations without source code.

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Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the Hainan Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China (620RC562, 2019RC096, 620RC560), the Scientific Research Setup Fund of Hainan University (KYQD(ZR)1877), the Program of Hainan Association for Science and Technology Plans to Youth R&D Innovation (QCXM201910), and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61802092, 62162021).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hainan University, Haikou, 570228, China

    Jiangyuan Yao, Chunxiang Xu, Deshun Li & Shengjun Lin

  2. University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z1, Canada

    Xingcan Cao

Authors
  1. Jiangyuan Yao
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  2. Chunxiang Xu
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  3. Deshun Li
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  4. Shengjun Lin
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  5. Xingcan Cao
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Deshun Li .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing, China

    Xingming Sun

  2. Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing, China

    Xiaorui Zhang

  3. Jinan University, Guangzhou, China

    Zhihua Xia

  4. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA

    Elisa Bertino

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Yao, J., Xu, C., Li, D., Lin, S., Cao, X. (2022). Formal Verification of Security Protocols: ProVerif and Extensions. In: Sun, X., Zhang, X., Xia, Z., Bertino, E. (eds) Artificial Intelligence and Security. ICAIS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13339. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06788-4_42

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06788-4_42

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-06787-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-06788-4

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