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Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques

EUROCRYPT 2022: Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2022 pp 845–875Cite as

Efficient Schemes for Committing Authenticated Encryption

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13276))

Abstract

This paper provides efficient authenticated-encryption (AE) schemes in which a ciphertext is a commitment to the key. These are extended, at minimal additional cost, to schemes where the ciphertext is a commitment to all encryption inputs, meaning key, nonce, associated data and message. Our primary schemes are modifications of GCM (for basic, unique-nonce AE security) and AES-GCM-SIV (for misuse-resistant AE security) and add both forms of commitment without any increase in ciphertext size. We also give more generic, but somewhat more costly, solutions.

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Acknowledgments

We thank the EUROCRYPT 2022 reviewers for their careful reading and valuable comments. Mihir Bellare was supported in part by NSF grant CNS-1717640 and a gift from Microsoft. Viet Tung Hoang was supported in part by NSF grants CNS-2046540 (CAREER), CICI-1738912, and CRII-1755539.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, USA

    Mihir Bellare

  2. Department of Computer Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA

    Viet Tung Hoang

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  1. Mihir Bellare
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  2. Viet Tung Hoang
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Correspondence to Viet Tung Hoang .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Haifa, Haifa, Haifa, Israel

    Orr Dunkelman

  2. University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

    Stefan Dziembowski

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Bellare, M., Hoang, V.T. (2022). Efficient Schemes for Committing Authenticated Encryption. In: Dunkelman, O., Dziembowski, S. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2022. EUROCRYPT 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13276. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07085-3_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07085-3_29

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