Abstract
Hotelling-Downs model is a classic model of political competition and strategizing candidates, almost always analyzed under plurality. Our paper presents a three-pronged development of the Hotelling-Downs model. First, we analyze competition under a variety of voting rules. Second, we consider not only a linear city model, but also a circular city model. Third, unlike most Hotelling-Downs papers, we solve the model under the winner-takes-all assumption, which saves many equilibria, and is more relevant to voting settings. In the case of three and four candidates we have found a measure of the set of equilibria.
Alexander Karpov was partially supported by the Basic Research Program of the HSE University. Omer Lev acknowledges support of ISF grants #1965/20 and #3152/20.
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Karpov, A., Lev, O., Obraztsova, S. (2022). Hotelling-Downs Equilibria: Moving Beyond Plurality Variants. In: Morais, D.C., Fang, L. (eds) Group Decision and Negotiation: Methodological and Practical Issues. GDN 2022. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 454. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07996-2_1
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