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Coevolutionary Approach to Sequential Stackelberg Security Games

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Computational Science – ICCS 2022 (ICCS 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13350))

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Abstract

The paper introduces a novel coevolutionary approach (CoEvoSG) for solving Sequential Stackelberg Security Games. CoEvoSG maintains two competing populations of players’ strategies. In the process inspired by biological evolution both populations are developed simultaneously in order to approximate Stackelberg Equilibrium. The comprehensive experimental study based on over 500 test instances of two game types proved CoEvoSG’s ability to repetitively find optimal or close to optimal solutions. The main strength of the proposed method is its time scalability which is highly competitive to the state-of-the-art algorithms and allows to calculate bigger and more complicated games than ever before. Due to the generic and knowledge-free design of CoEvoSG, the method can be applied to diverse real-life security scenarios.

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Acknowledgement

The project was funded by POB Research Centre Cybersecurity and Data Science of Warsaw University of Technology within the Excellence Initiative Program - Research University (ID-UB).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Mathematics and Information Science, Warsaw University of Technology, Koszykowa 75, 00-662, Warsaw, Poland

    Adam Żychowski & Jacek Mańdziuk

Authors
  1. Adam Żychowski
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  2. Jacek Mańdziuk
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Adam Żychowski .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Brunel University London, London, UK

    Derek Groen

  2. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Clélia de Mulatier

  3. AGH University of Science and Technology, Krakow, Poland

    Maciej Paszynski

  4. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Valeria V. Krzhizhanovskaya

  5. University of Tennessee at Knoxville, Knoxville, TN, USA

    Jack J. Dongarra

  6. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Peter M. A. Sloot

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Żychowski, A., Mańdziuk, J. (2022). Coevolutionary Approach to Sequential Stackelberg Security Games. In: Groen, D., de Mulatier, C., Paszynski, M., Krzhizhanovskaya, V.V., Dongarra, J.J., Sloot, P.M.A. (eds) Computational Science – ICCS 2022. ICCS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13350. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08751-6_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08751-6_8

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-08750-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-08751-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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