Abstract
The revenue gained by spectrum auctions has been an essential source of governmental income. Even though numerous studies have been conducted in auction literature, many catastrophic results occurred in the real world. In this paper, we demonstrate how one can use verification techniques to improve the design of spectrum auctions, i.e., to prevent the unexpected outcomes to happen. To do so, we model the spectrum auction in BPMN and verify certain properties of the auction model. To do so, we assign different capacity points to the bidders and check how it affects the revenue. A capacity point defines the maximum number of products that a bidder can win. Our study reveals which assignment of capacity points to the bidders leads to the worst auctioneer’s revenue.
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Ordoni, E., Mülle, J., Böhm, K. (2022). Results from the Verification of Models of Spectrum Auctions. In: Shishkov, B. (eds) Business Modeling and Software Design. BMSD 2022. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 453. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11510-3_4
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