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International Workshop on Rewriting Logic and its Applications

WRLA 2022: Rewriting Logic and Its Applications pp 253–273Cite as

Parallel Maude-NPA for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13252))

Abstract

Maude-NPA is a symbolic model checker for analyzing cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao strand space model modulo an equational theory defining the cryptographic operations, which starts from an attack state to find counterexamples by performing a backward narrowing reachability analysis. Although Maude-NPA is a powerful analyzer, its running performance can be improved by taking advantage of parallel and/or distributed computing when dealing with non-trivial protocols in which the state space is huge. This paper describes a parallel version of Maude-NPA and a tool that supports it. We report on some experiments of various kinds of protocols that demonstrate that the tool can increase the running performance of Maude-NPA by 30% on average for most non-trivial case studies in which the number of states located at each layer is considerably large.

This work was supported by JST SICORP Grant Number JPMJSC20C2, Japan, by grant S2018/TCS-4339 (BLOQUES-CM) funded by Comunidad de Madrid co-funded by EIE Funds of the European Union, by grant PID2019-108528RB-C22 (ProCode-UCM) funded by MICIN. S. Escobar has been partially supported by the grant RTI2018-094403-B-C32 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and ERDF A way of making Europe, by the grant PROMETEO/2019/098 funded by Generalitat Valenciana, and by the grant PCI2020-120708-2 funded by MICIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by the European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://github.com/canhminhdo/parallel-maude-npa.

  2. 2.

    http://personales.upv.es/sanesro/Maude-NPA_Protocols/index.html.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST), Nomi, Japan

    Canh Minh Do & Kazuhiro Ogata

  2. Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

    Adrián Riesco

  3. VRAIN, Universitat Politècnica de València, Valencia, Spain

    Santiago Escobar

Authors
  1. Canh Minh Do
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  2. Adrián Riesco
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  3. Santiago Escobar
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  4. Kazuhiro Ogata
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Canh Minh Do .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Pohang University of Science and Technology, Pohang, Korea (Republic of)

    Kyungmin Bae

A The Number of States Located at Each Layer

A The Number of States Located at Each Layer

The fourth column in Tables 4–5 shows the number of states located at each layer starting from depth zero up to the depth bound for each protocol, which is a list of natural numbers separated by commas. If the last value in the list is X, it means that there are X states located at the depth bound. Especially, if X is zero, it means that there is no state for the layer. If the last value in the list is of the form \(X + Y\), it means that there are \(X + Y\) states located at the depth bound while Y is the number of initial states (counterexamples).

Table 4. The number of states located at each layer
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Table 5. The number of states located at each layer
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Minh Do, C., Riesco, A., Escobar, S., Ogata, K. (2022). Parallel Maude-NPA for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis. In: Bae, K. (eds) Rewriting Logic and Its Applications. WRLA 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13252. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12441-9_13

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