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A Common Generalization of Budget Games and Congestion Games

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13584))

Abstract

Budget games are introduced by Drees, Feldotto, Riechers, and Skopalik (2015) as a model of noncooperative games arising from resource allocation problems. Budget games have several similarities to congestion games, one of which is that the matroid structure of the strategy space is essential for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). Despite these similarities, however, the theoretical relation between budget games and congestion games has been unclear. In this paper, we reveal the common structure of budget games and congestion games by providing a generalized model of budget games, called generalized budget games (g-budget games, for short). We show that the model of g-budget games includes weighted congestion games and player-specific congestion games under certain assumptions. We further show that g-budget games also include offset budget games, a generalized model of budget games by Drees, Feldotto, Riechers, and Skopalik (2019). We then prove that every matroid g-budget game has a PNE, which extends the result for budget games. We finally present a linear-time procedure to find a PNE in a certain class of singleton g-budget games.

The second author is partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP20K11699, Japan.

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Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

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Correspondence to Kenjiro Takazawa .

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Kiyosue, F., Takazawa, K. (2022). A Common Generalization of Budget Games and Congestion Games. In: Kanellopoulos, P., Kyropoulou, M., Voudouris, A. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13584. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_15

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-15713-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-15714-1

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