Abstract
This paper offers a framework for the study of strategic behavior in proxy voting, where non-active voters delegate their votes to active voters. It further studies how proxy voting affects the strategic behavior of non-active voters and proxies (active voters) under complete and partial information. We focus on the median voting rule for single-peaked preferences. Our results show strategyproofness with respect to non-active voters. Furthermore, while strategyproofness does not extend to proxies, we show that under mild restrictions strategic behavior can lead to socially optimal outcomes. For partial information settings, our results show that while convergence is guaranteed, it may be sub-optimal.
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This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF; Grant No. 2539/20).
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Bielous, G., Meir, R. (2022). Proxy Manipulation for Better Outcomes. In: Baumeister, D., Rothe, J. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems. EUMAS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13442. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_5
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