Abstract
Angular velocity can be measured by a gyroscope, which provides essential information to determine the heading direction of a vehicle. In particular, the z-axis of a gyroscope represents the vehicle’s rotation, information that is used to determine the current location. However, it is known that the current gyroscopes that are designed based on MEMS (Micro-Electromechanical Systems) have a vulnerability by which the gyroscope measurements can be damaged. When an acoustic signal with a resonant frequency of the MEMS gyroscope is injected, the MEMS gyroscope would incorrectly measure yaw rates. For this reason, it is important to protect the yaw rate from an acoustic signal injection attack to maintain the safety of the vehicle system. In this paper, we propose a recovery method for damaged yaw rates based on measurements from an accelerometer. Our method enables a vehicle to maintain its current location even if the signal injection attack attempts to manipulate its yaw rate measurement. In addition, we present the evaluation results showing that our method is able to properly estimate yaw rates based on x-axis and y-axis measurements of an accelerometer.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Institute for Information and Communications Technology Promotion (Development of Security Primitives for Unmanned Vehicles) and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea Government (MSIT) under Grant 2020-0-00374 and NRF-2020R1C1C1007446.
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Cho, H., Lee, S., Choi, W., Lee, D.H. (2023). Recovering Yaw Rate from Signal Injection Attack to Protect RV’s Direction. In: You, I., Youn, TY. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13720. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25659-2_13
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