Skip to main content

An Incentive Mechanism for Managing Obligation Delegation

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
  • 198 Accesses

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13857))

Abstract

Many modern information systems use a policy-based approach to manage sensitive information and availability of services. Obligations are essential part of security policies, which specify what actions a user is obliged to perform in the future. One interesting feature of obligations is unenforceable, that is, the system cannot guarantee that each obligation will be fulfilled. Indeed, obligations go unfulfilled for a variety of reasons. For example, a user may have family emergency that leads her having little time to discharge assigned obligations. We argue that delegation of obligations can be regarded as a means of providing opportunity for obligations to be discharged. However, this opportunity will be wasted if users who received delegation do not fulfil the obligations eventually. In this paper we propose a mechanism that incentivises users to accept and fulfil obligations for others by rewarding users credits. The amount of credits can be earned depends on their trust score, which reflects precisely how diligent of individuals in fulfilling obligations in the past. Users are motivated to raise up their trust scores by fulfilling obligations for others, in order to earn more credits in the future. We run experiments in a simulated multi-agent systems to evaluate our approach, which turns out that delegation with incentives achieves the best outcome in terms of the number of obligations being fulfilled.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   99.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Baracaldo, N., Joshi, J.: Beyond accountability: using obligations to reduce risk exposure and deter insider attacks. In: Proceedings of the 18th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, pp. 213–224 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1145/2462410.2462411

  2. Ben-Ghorbel-Talbi, M., Cuppens, F., Cuppens-Boulahia, N., Métayer, D.L., Piolle, G.: Delegation of obligations and responsibility. In: Proceedings of the 26th IFIP TC 11 International Information Security Conference, pp. 197–209 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21424-0_16

  3. Boella, G., van der Torre, L.W.N., Verhagen, H.: Introduction to normative multiagent systems. Comput. Math. Organiz. Theory 12(2–3), 71–79 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-006-9537-7

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Burnett, C., Oren, N.: Sub-delegation and trust. In: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp. 1359–1360 (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Chen, L., Crampton, J., Kollingbaum, M.J., Norman, T.J.: Obligations in risk-aware access control. In: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, pp. 145–152 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1109/PST.2012.6297931

  6. Chowdhury, O., Pontual, M., Winsborough, W.H., Yu, T., Irwin, K., Niu, J.: Ensuring authorization privileges for cascading user obligations. In: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, pp. 33–44 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1145/2295136.2295144

  7. Dougherty, D.J., Fisler, K., Krishnamurthi, S.: Obligations and their interaction with programs. In: Proceedings of the 12th European Symposium On Research In Computer Security, pp. 375–389 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74835-9_25

  8. Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P.: Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J. Law Econ. Organiz. 7, 24–52 (1991)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Irwin, K., Yu, T., Winsborough, W.H.: On the modeling and analysis of obligations. In: Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 134–143 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1145/1180405.1180423

  10. Keeping, E.S.: Introduction to statistical inference. Dover Publications, New York (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Norman, T.J., Reed, C.: A logic of delegation. Artif. Intell. 174(1), 51–71 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2009.10.001

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  12. Pontual, M., Chowdhury, O., Winsborough, W.H., Yu, T., Irwin, K.: Toward practical authorization-dependent user obligation systems. In: Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, pp. 180–191 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1145/1755688.1755711

  13. Schaad, A., Moffett, J.D.: Delegation of obligations. In: Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks, pp. 25–35 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1109/POLICY.2002.1011290

  14. Twidle, K.P., Dulay, N., Lupu, E., Sloman, M.: Ponder2: a policy system for autonomous pervasive environments. In: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Autonomic and Autonomous Systems, pp. 330–335 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1109/ICAS.2009.42

  15. Xu, C., Fong, P.W.L.: The specification and compilation of obligation policies for program monitoring. In: Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, pp. 77–78 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1145/2414456.2414501

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Liang Chen .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Chen, L., Zeng, C., Vidalis, S. (2023). An Incentive Mechanism for Managing Obligation Delegation. In: Kallel, S., Jmaiel, M., Zulkernine, M., Hadj Kacem, A., Cuppens, F., Cuppens, N. (eds) Risks and Security of Internet and Systems. CRiSIS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13857. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31108-6_15

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31108-6_15

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-31107-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-31108-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics