Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Elections*

Michelle Blom¹[0000-0002-0459-9917], Peter J. Stuckey²[0000-0003-2186-0459], Vanessa Teague^{3,4}[0000-0003-2648-2565], and Damjan Vukcevic⁵[0000-0001-7780-9586]

- School of Computing and Information Systems, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia. michelle.blom@unimelb.edu.au
 - ² Department of Data Science and AI, Monash University, Clayton, Australia
 - ³ Thinking Cybersecurity Pty. Ltd., Melbourne, Australia
 - ⁴ Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
- Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics, Monash University, Clayton, Australia

Abstract. Elections where electors rank the candidates (or a subset of the candidates) in order of preference allow the collection of more information about the electors' intent. The most widely used election of this type is Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV), where candidates are eliminated one by one, until a single candidate holds the majority of the remaining ballots. Condorcet elections treat the election as a set of simultaneous decisions about each pair of candidates. The Condorcet winner is the candidate who beats all others in these pairwise contests. There are various proposals to determine a winner if no Condorcet winner exists. In this paper we show how we can efficiently audit Condorcet elections for a number of variations. We also compare the audit efficiency (how many ballots we expect to sample) of IRV and Condorcet elections.

Keywords: Condorcet Elections \cdot Risk-Limiting Audits \cdot Instant-Runoff Voting \cdot Ranked Pairs

1 Introduction

In ranked or preferential vote elections, each ballot comprises an ordered list of (some or all of) the candidates. The ballot is interpreted as a statement that each candidate on the list is preferred by the voter to all the candidates after it, and any that don't appear on the ballot. Condorcet elections treat each election as a series of two-way contests between each pair of candidates A and B, by saying A beats B if the number of ballots that prefer A over B is greater than those that prefer B over A. A Condorcet winner exists if there is a single candidate that beats all other candidates. But it is quite possible to have ranked vote elections with no Condorcet winner. In this case there are many alternate strategies/election systems that can be used to choose a winner.

 $^{^\}star$ This work was supported by the University of Melbourne's Research Computing Services and the Petascale Campus Initiative; and by the Australian Research Council (Discovery Project DP220101012; OPTIMA ITTC IC200100009).

Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs) test a reported election outcome by sampling ballot papers and will correct a wrong outcome with high probability (by requiring a full manual count of the ballots). They will not change the outcome if it is correct. The *risk limit*, often denoted α , specifies that a wrong outcome will be corrected with probability at least $1-\alpha$. RLAs for Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) can be conducted efficiently using RAIRE [2]. RAIRE generates 'assertions' which, if true, rule out all outcomes in which the reported winner did not win. Assertions form the basis of an RLA that can be conducted using the SHANGRLA framework [3].

In this paper we show how to use the assertion-based methodology of Blom et al. [1] to form a set of assertions sufficient to conduct an RLA for a variety of Condorcet elections. Assertions with linear dependence on transformations of the votes can easily be transformed to canonical assorter form for SHANGRLA. We contrast the estimated difficulty of these audits, in terms of sample sizes required, against auditing IRV using RAIRE.

For ranked vote elections that have a Condorcet winner, we first consider an audit that checks that the reported winner is indeed the Condorcet winner (Section 3). For an election with n candidates, this requires n-1 assertions comparing the reported winner to each reported loser. We then consider Ranked Pairs, a Condorcet method that builds a preference relation over candidates on the basis of the strength of pairwise defeats (Section 4). We find, that for elections with a Condorcet winner, the expected sample sizes required to check that the reported winner is the Condorcet winner, or to audit as a Ranked Pairs or IRV election, are usually similar. In some instances, particularly those where the winner is decided by who is eliminated in the second-last round of IRV, we see more substantial differences in auditing difficulty.

To demonstrate the practicality of our auditing methods, we use IRV datasets from the Australian New South Wales (NSW) lower house elections in 2015 and 2019, in addition to a series of IRV elections held across the United States between 2007 and 2010. All of these elections have a Condorcet winner.

Finding ranked vote datasets from real elections that did not have a Condorcet winner was challenging. We were able to find some Single Transferable Vote (STV) elections, and some datasets from Preflib⁶, that met this criterion. For these instances, RAIRE often struggled to terminate when finding an appropriate set of assertions to audit. Auditing these elections as if they were Ranked Pairs elections was more successful. We present these results in Section 9.

We finally consider three additional Condorcet methods: Minimax (Section 5), Smith (Section 6), and Kemeny-Young (Section 7). We found that audits for these methods were generally not practical. Minimax and Smith default to electing the Condorcet winner when one exists, and in this case we can simply use the method outlined in Section 3. On our instances without a Condorcet winner, we generally did not find an audit for Minimax or Smith, with our proposed methods, that was not a full manual count.

⁶ www.preflib.org, accessed 14 Mar 2023

Table 1. Distribution of ballot types for two example elections.

Ballot Signature	Votes
A, B	5,000
B, C	2,500
C, A, B	500
B, A	300
Total Votes	8,300
(a) Election	1

A, C, B 20,000 B, C, A 19,000 C 5,000 Total Votes 44,000	Ballot Signature	Votes
C 5,000	A, C, B	20,000
,	B, C, A	19,000
Total Votes 44,000	C	5,000
	Total Votes	44,000

(b) Election 2

2 Preliminaries

In this paper, we consider ranked vote elections that require voters to cast a ballot in which they rank available candidates in order of preference, and a single winner is determined. For example, in an election with candidates A, B and C, a voter indicates which of these candidates is their most preferred, their second most preferred, and so on. Depending on the jurisdiction, voters may be required to rank all candidates (e.g., [A,B,C]) or express a partial ranking (e.g., [A,C]). The latter ballot is interpreted as expressing a preference for A over C, and that both A and C are preferred to all other candidates. The number of ballots on which a candidate is ranked first is their first-preference tally.

We define a ranked vote election as a pair $\mathcal{L} = (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{B})$ where \mathcal{C} is the set of candidates and \mathcal{B} the multiset of ballots cast. A ballot b is a sequence of candidates π , listed in order of preference (most popular first), without any duplicates but also without necessarily including all candidates. We use list notation to define the ranking on a ballot (e.g., $\pi = [c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4]$). Given an election \mathcal{L} , the election system determines which candidate $c \in \mathcal{C}$ is the winner.

2.1 Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV)

IRV is a type of ranked vote election. To determine the winner in an IRV election, each candidate is initially awarded all votes in which they are ranked first (known as their first preferences). The candidate with the smallest tally is eliminated, and the ballots in their tally pile are redistributed to the next most preferred candidate on the ballot who is still standing. For example, a ballot with the ranking [A, B, C] is first assigned to candidate A. If A were to be eliminated, the ballot would be given to candidate B, provided B has not already been eliminated. Subsequent rounds of elimination are performed in which the candidate with the smallest tally is eliminated, and the ballots in their tally pile redistributed, until we have one candidate left, or one of the remaining candidates has the majority of votes. This candidate is declared the winner.

Consider the distribution of votes present in two example elections shown in Table 1. In Election 1, candidates A, B, and C have first preference tallies of 5000, 2800, and 500, respectively. When viewed as an IRV election, candidate

⁷ Ties are also possible, but very rare for elections with many ballots.

Table 2. Election 3 example: (a) distribution of ballot types; (b) calculation of comparative tallies $T(i \succ j)$ for row i and column j; (c) calculation of scores s(i, j).

Ballot Signature	Votes									
A, B, D, C	7,000				_					
A, C, B, D	2,000	$T(i \succ j)$	A B	C 1	D	s(i,j)	A	B	C	D
B, C, D, A	4,000	A	19k	15k 11	k	A		9k	1k	-7k
B, D, A, C	6,000	B	10k	$17k\ 21$	k	B	-9k		5k	13k
C, A, B, D	2,000	C	14k $12k$	15	k	C	-1k	-5k		1k
C, D, A, B	7,000	D	18k 8k	14k		D	7k	-13k	-1k	
D, C, A, B	1,000		•		_					
Total Votes	27,000									
(a)			(b)					(c)		

A has the majority of votes on first preferences and is declared the winner. In Election 2, A, B, and C start with 20000, 19000, and 5000 votes, respectively. Candidate C is eliminated, with all of their ballots *exhausted*. Candidate A has more votes than B and is declared the winner. For the distribution of ballots for Election 3 shown in Table 2(a), when viewed as an IRV election, candidate D is eliminated first, then A, leaving B to win with a majority of votes.

3 Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Winners

In Condorcet elections we consider the ballots as applying to "separate" decisions about each pair of candidates $i, j \in \mathcal{C}$. A ballot b prefers i over j if i appears before j in b, or i appears on b and j does not. We define $T(i \succ j)$ to be the tally (i.e., number) of ballots $b \in \mathcal{B}$ that prefer i over j. Similarly, we define $T(j \succ i)$ to be the tally of ballots $b \in \mathcal{B}$ that prefer j over i. Note that $T(i \succ j) + T(j \succ i) \leq |\mathcal{B}|$ as some ballots may mention neither i nor j.

For the competition between a pair of candidates $i, j \in \mathcal{C}$, we define a score,

$$s(i,j) = T(i \succ j) - T(j \succ i). \tag{1}$$

In an election that satisfies the Condorcet winner criterion, the winner is the candidate $w \in \mathcal{C}$ for which s(w,c) > 0 for all $c \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{w\}$. In Election 1 of Table 1, candidate A is the Condorcet winner, because $T(A \succ B)$ is 5500, $T(B \succ A)$ is 2800, $T(A \succ C)$ is 5300, and $T(C \succ A)$ is 3000; giving s(A,B) = 2700 and s(A,C) = 2300. In Election 2 candidate C is the Condorcet winner since $T(A \succ C)$ is 20000, and $T(C \succ A)$ is 24000; $T(B \succ C)$ is 19000, and $T(C \succ B)$ is 25000; giving s(C,A) = 4000 and s(C,B) = 6000. Note how a Condorcet winner need not be the IRV winner (which is A). For Election 3, shown in Table 2(a), the tallies $T(i \succ j)$ for row i and column j are shown in Table 2(b), and the scores s(i,j) for row i and column j are shown in Table 2(c). There is no Condorcet winner since one of the scores in each row is negative.

We can audit the correctness of the winner in these elections by checking the assertions s(w,c)>0 for all $c\in\mathcal{C}\setminus\{w\}$. This is similar to auditing first-past-the-post elections where we compare the tallies of two candidates, but rather

than comparing tallies of ballots for each candidate we compare tallies of ballots that favor one candidate over the other. The tally of w, when compared with candidate c, is given by $t_w = T(w \succ c)$, and that of c is $t_c = T(c \succ w)$. Our assertion states that $t_w > t_c$ which can be transformed into an assorter as described by Blom et al. [1], and audited with SHANGRLA [3]. These assertions can be used to audit any Condorcet method where a Condorcet winner exists. We simply have to check that the reported winner is the Condorcet winner. We cannot do this for the election of Table 2, as it does not have a Condorcet winner. If the reported results indicate a Condorcet winner, but this is not actually the case, then at least one of assertions will be false, so with probability at least $1-\alpha$ the audit will not certify. Hence this is a valid RLA.

4 Risk-Limiting Audits for Ranked Pairs Elections

Ranked Pairs [4] is a type of Condorcet election that determines a winner even if no Condorcet winner exists. Ranked Pairs elections build a preference relation among candidates. First, we compute a score for each pair of candidates, as per Equation 1. Pairs with a positive score are called positive majorities. We consider each of these positive majority pairs in turn, from highest to lowest in score, and build a directed acyclic graph \mathcal{G} containing a node for each candidate, and edges representing preference relationships. When we consider a pair, (i, j), we add an edge from i to j in \mathcal{G} , if there does not already exist a path from j to i. If such a path exists, this means that the preference $i \succ j$ is inconsistent with the stronger preference relationships already added to \mathcal{G} . We therefore ignore pair (i, j) and move on to the next pair. If ever there is a candidate w s.t. there is a path in \mathcal{G} from w to all others, we declare w the winner.

Consider Elections 1 and 2 in Table 1. As Ranked Pairs elections, we assign the scores shown in Table 3 to each pair. For Election 1, the sorted positive majorities are (B,C), (A,B), and (A,C). We first add $B \succ C$, and then $A \succ B$, to \mathcal{G} . At this point, we have established that A is preferred to B, and by transitivity, that A is preferred to C. We can stop at this point, as we have established enough preference relationships to declare A as the winner, and cannot add a later preference, or generate a new transitive inference, that will be inconsistent with these relationships. In Election 2, the sorted list of positive majorities is (C,B), (C,A), and (A,B). After the first two preference relationships are added to \mathcal{G} , we have established that C is the winner. The Ranked Pairs winner always coincides with the Condorcet winner if one exists.

Consider Election 3 shown in Table 2. The ranked positive majorities are (B, D), (A, B), (D, A), (B, C), (C, D), and (A, C). We add $B \succ D$ and then $A \succ B$ to \mathcal{G} . We ignore (D, A) since we have already inferred $A \succ D$ by transitivity. We then add $B \succ C$ to \mathcal{G} . We now have enough information to declare A the winner, as they are preferred to all other candidates through transitivity. Note that when treated as an IRV election, B is the winner.

To audit a Ranked Pairs election, we must check that all preference statements between pairs of candidates that were *ultimately used* to establish that

Election 1 Election 2 s(A,B)2700 1000

Table 3. Pairwise scores for pairs in Elections 1 and 2 of Table 1.

s(B,A)-2700-1000s(A,C)2300 -4000s(C,A)-23004000 s(B,C)7300 -6000s(C, B)-73006000

the reported winner w won do in fact hold. Denote the set of preference relationships we commit to (i.e., that we add to \mathcal{G}) by the Ranked Pairs tabulation process up to the point at which the winning candidate is established as \mathcal{M} . In Election 1 of Table 1, the winner is established after the first two commits. Thus, $\mathcal{M} = \{B \succ C, A \succ B\}$. For Election 2 of Table 1, $\mathcal{M} = \{C \succ B, C \succ A\}$. For Election 3 in Table 2, $\mathcal{M} = \{B \succ D, A \succ B, B \succ C\}$.

Let \mathcal{T} denote the set of transitively inferred preferences $i \succ j$ that were made in the tabulation process up to the point at which the winner is established. Each such inference is associated with a path in \mathcal{G} from i to j. We denote the set of preferences that were used to form the transitive inference $i \succ j$ as basis $(i \succ j)$. This consists of all preference relationships along a path from i to j in \mathcal{G} . In Election 1 of Table 1, $\mathcal{T} = \{A \succ C\}$ and basis $(A \succ C) = \{A \succ B, B \succ C\}$. For Election 3 in Table 2, $\mathcal{T} = \{A \succ D, A \succ C\}$. For these transitive inferences, $basis(A \succ D) = \{A \succ B, B \succ D\}, \text{ and } basis(A \succ C) = \{A \succ B, B \succ C\}.$

We now define the assertions \mathcal{A} required to audit a Ranked Pairs election. First, for each $w > j \in \mathcal{M}$, where w is the reported winner, we must check that s(w,j) > 0. This corresponds to checking that (w,j) is a positive majority, where $T(w \succ j) - T(j \succ w) > 0$. This can be achieved as outlined in Section 3.

Next, we must check that any transitive inference $w \succ c$, from \mathcal{T} , that we used to declare w the winner could not have been contradicted by a pair (c, w) that, in the true outcome, was actually stronger than one or more of the preferences used to infer $w \succ c$ in the reported outcome. In Example 1 of Table 1, this could occur if the pair (C, A) actually had a strength of 8000, for example, in place of -2300. If this were the case, C > A should have been the first preference committed, ultimately leading to B being declared the winner in place of A.

Note that in Ranked Pairs elections where we have a Condorcet winner, we could simply verify that the reported winner was the Condorcet winner, irrespective of whether transitive inferences were used in the tabulation process. This would remove the need for an additional type of assertion, which we present in the next section. For most election instances we consider in our Results (Section 9), our Ranked Pairs auditing method reduces to checking the set of assertions for verifying that the reported winner is the Condorcet winner (see Section 3). This is because transitive inferences were not used to establish the winner in these cases. However, checking these transitive inferences, when they are used, through the assertions developed in the next section, can sometimes be more efficient.

4.1 Assertions and Assorters for Transitive Inferences

For each transitive inference of the form $w \succ c \in \mathcal{T}$, we must check that:

$$s(i,j) > s(c,w), \quad \forall i \succ j \in \text{basis}(w \succ c).$$

We can translate this expression into the following:

$$T(i \succ j) - T(j \succ i) > T(c \succ w) - T(w \succ c)$$

$$T(i \succ j) + T(w \succ c) - T(c \succ w) - T(j \succ i) > 0$$
 (2)

We use the approach of Blom et al. [1] to construct an assorter for an assertion of the form shown in Equation 2. We first form a proto-assorter

$$g(b) = b_1 + b_2 - b_3 - b_4$$

where b is a ballot and each b_i is the number of votes the ballot b contributes to the category t_i , where $t_1 = T(i \succ j)$, $t_2 = T(w \succ c)$, $t_3 = T(c \succ w)$, and $t_4 = T(j \succ i)$. We then form an assorter, h(b), for our assertion in Equation 2 using Equation 2 of Blom et al. [1]. This equation states that $h(b) = \frac{g(b)-a}{-2a}$ where a denotes the minimum value of g(b) for any b. In our case, a = -2, giving

$$h(b) = \frac{g(b) + 2}{4}.$$

The assorter h calculates the mean score \bar{h} over the ballots b examined in an audit. By construction $\bar{h} > 1/2$ if and only if the assertion s(i,j) > s(c,w) holds, to make it fit into the SHANGRLA testing framework [3].

4.2 Correctness of Audit Assertions

The assertions in the Ranked Pairs audit are then:

$$\mathcal{A} = \{ s(w, c) > 0 : w \succ c \in \mathcal{M} \} \cup$$

$$\{ s(i, j) > s(c, w) : i \succ j \in \text{basis}(w \succ c), w \succ c \in \mathcal{T} \}.$$

$$(3)$$

We now show that if these assertions are all verified to risk limit α then the declared winner is correct with risk limit α .

Theorem 1. If the declared winner w is not the correct winner of a Ranked Pairs election, then the probability that an audit verifies all the assertions in A is at most α , where α is the risk limit of the audit of each individual assertion.

Proof. Let \mathcal{M} be the set of ranked pairs committed to \mathcal{G} in the reported election, \mathcal{T} the transitively inferred preferences from \mathcal{M} . Let \mathcal{M}' be the set of ranked pairs committed to \mathcal{G} for the actual election results, and \mathcal{T}' the transitively inferred preferences from \mathcal{M}' . Assume that $w' \neq w$ is the actual winner.

Suppose that $w \succ w' \in \mathcal{T}$, so we audit s(i,j) > s(w',w) for all $i \succ j \in basis(w \succ w')$. If all of these facts were correct then the ranked pair voting

algorithm (on the true counts) would find $w \succ w'$ by transitive closure. Contradiction. So at least one of them must not hold, and the audit will accept it with probability at most α .

Otherwise $w \succ w' \in \mathcal{M}$. If s(w',w) > 0 then this contradicts the audited assertion, which will be accepted with probability at most α . So suppose s(w',w) < 0. Since w' beats w there is a w'' such that $w' \succ w'' \in \mathcal{T}'$ and $w'' \succ w' \in \mathcal{M}'$ and s(w'',w) > s(w,w') > 0. Now in the reported election either $w \succ w'' \in \mathcal{M}$ in which case the assertion s(w,w'') > 0 will be accepted with probability at most α , or $w \succ w'' \in \mathcal{T}$ and we use the argument of the previous paragraph to show that the audit will accept with probability at most α .

Consider Election 3 shown in Table 2. In the Ranked Pairs election we established A as the winner using $\mathcal{M} = \{B \succ D, A \succ B, B \succ C\}$ and $\mathcal{T} = \{A \succ D, A \succ C\}$, where basis $(A \succ D) = \{A \succ B, B \succ D\}$ and basis $(A \succ C) = \{A \succ B, B \succ C\}$. So the assertions we need to verify are s(A, B) > 0; s(A, B) > s(D, A) and s(B, D) > s(D, A); and s(A, B) > s(C, A) and s(B, C) > s(C, A).

Note that Tideman describes a particular approach for resolving ties between sorted majorities [4]. If the choice of which majority to process first, among those that tie, changes the ultimate winner then a full manual hand count will be required. The manner in which such ties are resolved can have an impact on the overall set of assertions formed. For example, consider a case where we have three positive majorities (A, B), (A, C), and (B, C) in a three-candidate election. The first is the strongest, while the latter two tie. Of the latter two, if we choose to process (A, C) first, then our audit will form two assertions: s(A, B) > 0 and s(A, C) > 0. If we choose to process (B, C) first then we will form the assertions: s(A, B) > 0, s(A, B) > s(C, A) and s(B, C) > s(C, A).

5 RLAs for Minimax Elections

In a Minimax election, a pairwise score is computed for each pair of candidates, c and c', denoted ms(c, c'). There are variations on how this score can be defined⁸. One method, denoted margins, is defined by:

$$ms(c,c') = T(c \succ c') - T(c' \succ c).$$

This score computation method is equivalent to that used in Ranked Pairs. We use this approach when forming assertions to audit Minimax elections. Variations could be used instead, however their equations must be linear to be used within the assertion-assorter framework of Blom et al. [1].

If there is a Condorcet winner, then this candidate wins. Suppose it is candidate w, then we have ms(w,c)>0 for all $c\in\mathcal{C}\setminus\{w\}$ when either the margins or winning votes scoring method is used. Otherwise, the winning candidate is the one with the smallest loss in pairwise contests with each other candidate.

Consider the example elections in Table 1. Table 3 records the pairwise scores for each pair of candidates. In both of our example elections, candidate A is the

⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method, accessed 14 Mar 2023

Condorcet winner. In Election 1, ms(A, B) = 2700 and ms(A, C) = 2300. In Election 2, ms(C, B) = 6000 and ms(C, A) = 4000.

In the case where we have a Condorcet winner w under Minimax, we simply need to audit that ms(w,c) > 0 for all $c \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{w\}$, as described in Section 3.

In the case where we do not have a Condorcet winner, we compute each candidate c's largest margin of loss, LL(c). The candidate c with the smallest LL(c) is the winner. Consider a case with the pairwise scores shown below (left). In this example, we have the largest losses shown on the right. In this case, candidate B has the smallest largest loss and is the winner.

$$ms(A, B) = 2000$$
 $LL(A) = 8000$ $ms(B, C) = 5000$ $LL(B) = 2000$ $LL(C) = 5000$

To audit a Minimax election, in the event that a Condorcet winner does not exist, we can first verify which pairwise defeats represent the strongest defeat for each candidate. In the example above, we could show that $A \succ B$ is the strongest defeat of B by showing that ms(A,B) > ms(c,B) for all $c \in C \setminus \{A\}$. We then need to show that ms(A,B) is less than the score of the strongest defeat of each other candidate. In the example above, this reduces to checking that ms(B,C) > ms(A,B) and ms(C,A) > ms(A,B).

6 Smith

The Smith set in an election refers to the smallest set of candidates S such that every candidate in S defeats every candidate outside of S in a pairwise contest. For all $c \in S$ and $c' \in C \setminus S$, we have $T(c \succ c') > T(c' \succ c)$. The Smith set always exists and is well defined⁹. If a Condorcet winner exists, they will be the sole member of this set. If the Smith set contains more than one candidate, IRV or Minimax can be used to select a single winner from that set. Alternatively, all candidates in the Smith set can be viewed as winners (if appropriate).

If we have a Condorcet winner, w, an audit would proceed by checking that w defeats all other candidates in a pairwise contest. Otherwise, we need to first check that the reported Smith set is correct. To do so, we first show that $T(c \succ c') > T(c' \succ c)$ for all $c \in S, c' \not\in S$. Next, we must show that removing any one candidate from our set would violate this condition: $\forall c \in S, \exists c' \in S, T(c \succ c') > T(c' \succ c)$. In other words, that each candidate in the set is defeated by another candidate in the set. We then audit the resulting Minimax or IRV election over S. It may be that a candidate in the Smith set defeats multiple candidates in the set. For the purposes of auditing, we choose to check the defeat with the largest margin. If there are candidates in the Smith set that tie (i.e., $T(c \succ c') = T(c' \succ c)$ for some $c, c' \in S$), then a full manual count is required.

⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smith_set, accessed 14 Mar 2023

7 Kemeny-Young

Under Kemeny-Young, we start by computing pairwise scores for each pair of candidates (c,c'), $T(c \succ c')$. We then imagine all possible complete orders (rankings) among the candidates in the election. We assign a score to each ranking using the pairwise scores we have just computed. Consider the ranking [A,B,C] in an election with candidates A,B and C. The ranking score is equal to $T(A \succ B) + T(A \succ C) + T(B \succ C)$. For each candidate c that appears above another c' in a ranking, we add $T(c \succ c')$ to the ranking score. The winning candidate is the candidate ranked first in the highest scoring ranking.

We can view each ranking π as an entity with a tally, $T(\pi)$. The tally for the ranking $\pi = [A, B, C]$, for example, is $T(\pi) = T(A \succ B) + T(A \succ C) + T(B \succ C)$. Let π_r denote the reported highest scoring ranking. For elections with a very small number of candidates, we can form an audit in which we check that $T(\pi_r) > T(\pi')$ for every possible ranking π' with a different first-ranked candidate to π_r . For an election with k candidates, an audit with (k-1)! assertions is formed. A 13 candidate election, however, will require 4.8×10^8 assertions!

While it is technically possible to form a RLA that is not a full recount for a Kemeny-Young election, all election instances we consider in this paper have too many candidates for this method to be practical. We are not aware of any other methods for generating efficient RLAs for Kemeny-Young elections.

8 Other Condorcet Methods

Some other Condorcet methods, such as Schulze and Copeland, are not auditable by the assertion-assorter framework as it stands. To form a RLA using this framework, we need to be able to check that the reported winner won through a series of comparisons over sums of ballots. Under both the Schulze and Copeland methods, we use such comparisons to perform a meta-level reasoning step.

Under Copeland, for example, we compute each candidate c's Copeland score CS(c), which is the number of candidates c' for which $T(c \succ c') > T(c' \succ c)$ plus a half times the number of candidates c' for which $T(c \succ c') = T(c' \succ c)$. We then elect the candidate with the highest Copeland score.

Under the Schulze method, we assign scores to each pair of candidates using the winning votes method as per Minimax (see Section 5). Consider a graph where for each pair of candidates, (c, c'), we have a directed edge from c to c' with a weight equal to s(c, c'). We define the strength of a path in this graph between candidates c and c' as the weight of the weakest link along this path. For each pair of candidates, we compute the strength of the strongest path between the pair. Where there are multiple paths between the candidates, the strongest path is the one with the largest weight on its weakest link. If there is no path, the strength of their strongest path is set to zero. Let us denote the strength of the strongest path between c and c' as p(c, c'). We say that $c \succ c'$ if p(c, c') > p(c', c). The winner is the candidate w for which $w \succ c$ for all $c \in \mathcal{C} \setminus \{w\}$.

9 Results

We consider the set of IRV elections conducted in the 2015 and 2019 New South Wales (NSW) Legislative Assembly (lower house) elections, and a number of US-based IRV elections conducted between 2007 and 2010. For each instance, we reinterpret it as Condorcet, Ranked Pairs, Minimax and Smith elections. We report the estimated difficulty of conducting a comparison RLA for each instance when viewed as an IRV election or one of the alternative Condorcet methods. We assume a risk limit of 5%, and an error rate of 0.002. RAIRE [2] is used to generate assertions for auditing each instance as an IRV election. Note that the intention behind the reporting of these results is not to recommend one type of election over others, but to demonstrate the practicality, or lack thereof, of the auditing methods we have proposed.

We estimate the sample size (ASN) required to audit a set of assertions \mathcal{A} , with a chosen SHANGRLA risk function (we used Kaplan-Kolmogorov), through simulation. For each assertion $a \in \mathcal{A}$, we performed 2000 simulations in which we randomly distributed errors across the population of auditable ballots, and determined how many ballots needed to be sampled for the risk to fall below the desired threshold. We took the median of the resulting sample sizes to compute an anticipated sample size for the assertion. We took the largest of these sample sizes, across \mathcal{A} , as the expected sample size required for the audit. We used this process to estimate required sample sizes for all election types.

Across all the IRV instances we considered, the same winner was declared when the ballots were tabulated according to the rules of IRV, Condorcet, and Ranked Pairs. All instances have a Condorcet winner. In all but one election—a US instance, Pierce County Executive 2008—the estimated difficulty of auditing each election as either a Ranked Pairs or Condorcet election was the same. For Pierce County Executive 2008, checking each $T(w \succ c) - T(c \succ w) > 0$ assertion requires an estimated 627 ballot polls, the same ASN as the IRV audit. When audited as a Ranked Pairs election, an estimated 507 ballot polls are required. This is because in the Ranked Pairs election we are able to declare a winner before committing to all (w,c) pairs, through the use of a transitive inference. This means that in the audit, we can avoid checking one of the $w \succ c$ comparisons and instead check some easier assertions to verify the transitive inference used.

Table 4 reports the expected sample sizes required to audit selected elections that took place in the 2015–19 NSW Legislative Assembly elections as either IRV, Condorcet, or Ranked Pairs. Table 5 reports the same for selected US instances. Instances for which the expected sample sizes differed substantially in the different contexts are in bold. In general, there was no substantial difference in these expected sample sizes when auditing an instance as an IRV, Condorcet, or Ranked Pairs election.

9.1 IRV vs Ranked Pairs

In a small number of cases—Lismore (NSW) in 2015 and 2019; and Pierce County Executive (2008)—there was a substantial difference in the auditing difficulty in

Table 4. Estimated sample sizes, expressed as both a number of ballots and percentage of the total ballots cast, required to audit selected IRV elections from the 2015–19 NSW Legislative Council elections (as IRV using RAIRE, Ranked Pairs [RP], and Condorcet [CDT]). Instances where the ASN for the audits across the different election types are substantially different are in bold. All instances have a Condorcet winner.

Instance	RAIRE IRV			RP	CDT			
	ASN	V (%)	ASN (%)		ASN	1 (%)		
2015								
Albury	31	0.06%	28	0.06%	28	0.06%		
Auburn	74	0.15%	74	0.15%	74	0.15%		
Ballina	155	0.32%	137	0.28%	137	0.28%		
Balmain	99	0.20%	99	0.20%	99	0.20%		
Clarence	42	0.09%	42	0.09%	42	0.09%		
Coffs Harbour	32	0.07%	27	0.06%	27	0.06%		
Coogee	137	0.29%	137	0.29%	137	0.29%		
East Hills	1309	2.60%	1309	2.60%	1309	2.60%		
Gosford	3889	7.70%	3889	7.70%	3889	7.70%		
Granville	207	0.43%	207	0.43%	207	0.43%		
Lismore	1138	$\boldsymbol{2.35\%}$	4689	9.70%	4689	9.70%		
Manly	15	0.03%	15	0.03%	15	0.03%		
Maroubra	35	0.07%	35	0.07%	35	0.07%		
Monaro	152	0.32%	152	0.32%	152	0.32%		
Mount Druitt	26	0.05%	26	0.05%	26	0.05%		
Strathfield	227	0.46%	227	0.46%	227	0.46%		
Summer Hill	45	0.09%	45	0.09%	45	0.09%		
Sydney	54	0.12%	54	0.12%	54	0.12%		
Tamworth	41	0.08%	38	0.08%	38	0.08%		
The Entrance	1596	3.18%	1596	3.18%	1596	3.18%		
2019	=		-					
Albury	25	0.05%	25	0.05%	25	0.05%		
Auburn	45	0.09%	45	0.09%	45	0.09%		
Ballina	98	0.19%	97	0.19%	97	0.19%		
Balmain	44	0.09%	44	0.09%	44	0.09%		
Coogee	248	0.52%	248	0.52%	248	0.52%		
Cronulla	20	0.04%	19	0.04%	19	0.04%		
Drummoyne	27	0.05%	25	0.05%	25	0.05%		
Dubbo	234	0.46%	234	0.46%	234	0.46%		
East Hills	1173	2.30%	1173	2.30%	1173	2.30%		
Hawkesbury	25	0.05%	25	0.05%	25	0.05%		
Holsworthy	130	0.25%	130	0.25%	130	0.25%		
Keira	19	0.04%	19	0.04%	19	0.04%		
Kogarah	236	0.49%	236	0.49%	236	0.49%		
Lismore	1363	$\boldsymbol{2.71\%}$	313	0.62%	313	0.62%		
Mulgoa	34	0.06%	34	0.06%	34	0.06%		
Murray	129	0.26%	129	0.26%	129	0.26%		
Newcastle	25	0.05%	24	0.05%	24	0.05%		
Oxley	34	0.07%	28	0.06%	28	0.06%		
Penrith	333	0.64%	333	0.64%	333	0.64%		

Table 5. Estimated sample sizes, expressed as a number of ballots and percentage of the total ballots cast, required to audit a set of US IRV elections (as IRV using RAIRE, Ranked Pairs [RP], and Condorcet [CDT]). Instances where the ASNs are substantially different across election types are in bold. CC, CA, and CE denote City Council, County Assessor, and County Executive. All instances have a Condorcet winner.

Instance	RAIRE IRV		RP		CDT	
	ASN (%)		ASN (%)		ASN (%)	
Aspen 2009 CC	249	10%	249	10%	249	10%
Aspen 2009 Mayor	100	3.96%	142	5.60%	142	5.60%
Berkeley 2010 D1 CC	18	0.32%	16	0.28%	16	0.28%
Berkeley 2010 D4 CC	31	0.65%	31	0.65%	31	0.65%
Berkeley 2010 D7 CC	40	0.96%	40	0.96%	40	0.96%
Berkeley 2010 D8 CC	17	0.37%	17	0.37%	17	0.37%
Oakland 2010 D4 CC	33	0.16%	31	0.15%	31	0.15%
Oakland 2010 D6 CC	18	0.14%	16	0.12%	16	0.12%
Oakland 2010 Mayor	499	0.42%	499	0.42%	499	0.42%
Pierce 2008 CC	70	0.18%	70	0.18%	70	0.18%
Pierce 2008 CA	1153	0.44%	1153	0.44%	1153	0.44%
Pierce 2008 CA	64	0.04%	64	0.04%	64	0.04%
Pierce 2008 CE	624	0.21%	507	$\boldsymbol{0.17\%}$	624	0.21%
San Francisco Mayor 2007	10	0.01%	9	0.01%	9	0.01%

the two contexts. For Lismore (2015), we expect to audit the IRV election with a sample size of 1138 ballots, and the Ranked Pairs with 4689 ballots. For Lismore (2019), the situation is reversed, with an estimated 313 ballots required to audit the Ranked Pairs election and 1363 ballots for the IRV. In the Pierce County Executive (2008) election, we expect to sample 624 ballots for the IRV election and 507 ballots for the Ranked Pairs. All three of these instances share a common feature: when tabulated as an IRV election, the candidate who is eliminated in the last round of elimination determines the winner.

In Lismore (2015) [1138 ballots IRV vs 4689 ballots Ranked Pairs], the Nationals (NAT) candidate wins. In the last round of elimination, this candidate, alongside a Green (GRN) and a Country Labor (CLP) remain standing. Their tallies at this stage are 20567, 12771 and 12357 votes, respectively. Given the nature of Australian politics, we would expect the majority of ballots sitting with the GRN at this stage to flow on to the CLP, if they were eliminated. Conversely, if the CLP were eliminated, we would expect ballots to flow on to both the NAT and GRN candidates. In this case, the CLP is eliminated, and we are left with the NAT on 21660 votes and the GRN on 19310. In the Ranked Pairs variation, the most difficult assertion to check is that s(NAT, CLP) > 0, which equates to $T(NAT \succ CLP) - T(CLP \succ NAT) > 0$. The difference in these tallies is just 186 votes. The most difficult assertion RAIRE has to check is that the GRN is not eliminated before the CLP in the context where just they and the NAT remain. Here, the tallies of the GRN and CLP differ by 414 votes.

In Lismore (2019) [1363 ballots IRV vs 313 ballots Ranked Pairs], the CLP candidate wins. In the last round of elimination, we have the CLP on 12860 votes, the GRN on 12500, and the NAT on 20094. In this case, the GRN is eliminated leaving the NAT on 20712 votes, and the CLP on 21862. In the Ranked Pairs variation, the smallest tally difference we need to check is that $T(CLP \succ NAT) - T(NAT \succ CLP) > 0$. In the reported results, the LHS equals 1150 votes. Checking that $T(NAT \succ GRN) - T(GRN \succ NAT) > 0$ is much simpler, with the LHS equal to 15494 votes. RAIRE has to show that the CLP cannot be eliminated before the GRN in that last round elimination. This is more difficult, with a difference of only 360 votes separating the two.

9.2 Elections without a Condorcet winner

All instances in Table 4 and Table 5 have a Condorcet winner. We have found several ranked vote datasets that, when treated as a single-winner election, do not have a Condorcet winner. Table 6 reports the estimated sample sizes required to audit these instances as IRV (using RAIRE), Ranked Pairs, Minimax, and Smith. RAIRE did not terminate in a reasonable time frame (24 hours) in 6/9 of these instances. RAIRE relies on being able to prune large portions of the space of alternate election outcomes through carefully chosen assertions. In these instances, RAIRE was unable to do this. The number of votes for each ballot signature in the Preflib instances were multiplied by 1000 to form larger elections.

For the Smith method, Table 6 reports the difficulty of both checking the correctness of the Smith set, and auditing the whole election using either Minimax or IRV to find a winner from the Smith set. For the Byron instance, with 32 candidates, the estimated sample size required to verify the correctness of the Smith set is 844 ballots (4.8% of the total ballots cast). The first stage of verifying the Smith set—checking that each candidate in the set defeats all candidates outside the set—requires 112 assertions. The second stage—checking that each candidate within the Smith set defeats another candidate in the set—requires 4 assertions. Verifying the winner from the Smith set using IRV requires an estimated sample size of 327 ballots (1.84%). The ASN of the overall audit, with IRV used to select the winner, is 844 ballots. With Minimax used to select the overall winner, however, a full manual count is required.

Across the ED instances, with the exception of ED-10-47, there are ties present between candidates in the Smith set, and a full manual count is required. Across the Leeton, Parkes, and Yass Valley instances, the second stage of verifying the correctness of the Smith set involves at least one comparison with a very small margin. For the ED-10-47 instance, there are tied winners under Minimax when selecting the winner from the Smith set.

10 Conclusion

We have presented methods for generating assertions sufficient for conducting RLAs for several Condorcet methods, including Ranked Pairs. We have found that auditing a ranked vote election as IRV or Ranked Pairs requires similar

Table 6. Estimated sample sizes, expressed as a number of ballots and percentage of the total ballots cast, required to audit a set of ranked vote election instances without a Condorcet winner (as IRV using RAIRE, Ranked Pairs, Minimax [MM], and Smith). Instances where the ASN for the audits are substantially different across election types are in bold. A '–' denotes that assertions could not be found within 24 hours by the associated algorithm, and ' ∞ ' denotes that a full manual hand count is required. The overall ASN for each Smith RLA is the maximum of the cost of verifying the Smith set and verifying the winner from the Smith set using either Mimimax of IRV.

Instance	RAIRE IRV	RP	MM	Sмітн					
	ASN (%)	ASN (%)	ASN (%)	VERIFY SS ASN (%)		IRV ASN (%)			
2021 NSW L	2021 NSW Local Government Elections (originally STV)								
Byron	_	∞	∞	844 4.8%	∞	$327\ 1.84\%$			
Leeton	_	1219 2%	∞	∞	∞	∞			
Parkes	_	∞	∞	∞	∞	∞			
Yass Valley	_	1624 1.7%	∞	∞	∞	∞			
Preflib Election Data									
ED-7-5.soi	_	2828 2.7%	2828 2.7%	∞	∞	∞			
ED-7-19.soi	∞	563~0.56%	563~0.56%	∞	∞	∞			
ED-10-26.soi	56 0.35%	113~0.71%	∞	∞	∞	∞			
ED-10-47.soi	120 0.71%	∞	∞	120 - 0.71%	∞	59~0.35%			
ED-34-1.soi	_	4577 1.2%	∞	∞	∞	∞			

estimated sample sizes, in general. Most Ranked Pairs audits reduce to checking that the reported winner is the Condorcet winner. Where the election does not have a Condorcet winner, it appears that auditing the instance as a Ranked Pairs election is generally more practical than if it were an IRV election. We have considered auditing methods for other Condorcet methods, such as Minimax, Smith, and Kemeny-Young, however these were generally not practical.

References

- Blom, M., Budurushi, J., Rivest, R.L., Stark, P.B., Stuckey, P.J., Teague, V., Vukcevic, D.: Assertion-based approaches to auditing complex elections, with application to party-list proportional elections. In: Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 12900, pp. 47–62. Springer, Cham (Sep 2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86942-7_4, Preprint: arXiv:2107.11903
- 2. Blom, M., Stuckey, P.J., Teague, V.: RAIRE: Risk-limiting audits for IRV elections. arXiv:1903.08804 (2019)
- 3. Stark, P.B.: Sets of half-average nulls generate risk-limiting audits: SHANGRLA. In: Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 12063, pp. 319–336. Springer, Cham (Aug 2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54455-3_23, Preprint: arXiv:1911.10035
- Tideman, T.N.: Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules. Social Choice and Welfare 4(3), 185–206 (1987)