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Annual Privacy Forum

APF 2014: Privacy Technologies and Policy pp 133–142Cite as

Auctioning Privacy-Sensitive Goods:

A Note on Incentive-Compatibility

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8450))

Abstract

One mechanism to obtain valuations of personal data from individuals is the reverse second-price Vickrey auction (RVA), which is assumed to be an incentive-compatible mechanism. Herein, it is analyzed whether conditions for RVA incentive-compatibility exist, once personal data is sensitive and induces privacy costs. In the experiment subjects could sell the result of a logic test together with their name as privacy-sensitive good using an auction mechanism. The winner’s identity and result was revealed to the group. The key result is that a significant ‘identification effect’ exists that acts as auction entry barrier. Thus, the RVA is not an incentive-compatible mechanism for obtaining valuations of privacy-sensitive goods.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. DIW Berlin, Mohrenstrasse 58, 10117, Berlin, Germany

    Nicola Jentzsch

Authors
  1. Nicola Jentzsch
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering (ESAT), KU Leuven and iMinds, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, Bus 2446, 3001, Leuven, Belgium

    Bart Preneel

  2. Information Security and Data Protection Unit, ENISA, 1 Vasilissis Sofias, Marousi, 15124, Athens, Greece

    Demosthenes Ikonomou

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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Jentzsch, N. (2014). Auctioning Privacy-Sensitive Goods:. In: Preneel, B., Ikonomou, D. (eds) Privacy Technologies and Policy. APF 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8450. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06749-0_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06749-0_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-06748-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-06749-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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