Abstract
We reinvestigate a notion of one-time programs introduced in the CRYPTO 2008 paper by Goldwasser et al. A one-time program is a device containing a program \(C\), with the property that the program \(C\) can be executed on at most one input. Goldwasser et al. show how to implement one-time programs on devices equipped with special hardware gadgets called one-time memory tokens.
We provide an alternative construction that does not rely on the hardware gadgets. Instead, it is based on the following assumptions: (1) the total amount of data that can leak from the device is bounded, and (2) the total memory on the device (available both to the honest user and to the attacker) is also restricted, which is essentially the model used recently by Dziembowski et al. (TCC 2011, CRYPTO 2011) to construct one-time computable pseudorandom functions and key-evolution schemes.
Keywords
This work was partly supported by the WELCOME/2010-4/2 grant founded within the framework of the EU Innovative Economy (National Cohesion Strategy) Operational Programme. The European Research Council has provided financial support for this work under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant agreement no CNTM-207908.
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- 1.
In the work of Dziembowski et al. [8] the adversary \(\mathcal {A}_{small}\) is used to model the malicious code executed on the device (e.g. a computer virus), while in our case it models the tampering function. While in real life mallware is usually much more powerful than hardware tampering functions, we adopt the model of [8] since we do not see any other natural restriction on the tampering function that would lead to better parameters or the simpler proofs.
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Durnoga, K., Dziembowski, S., Kazana, T., Zaja̧c, M. (2014). One-Time Programs with Limited Memory. In: Lin, D., Xu, S., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8567. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12087-4_24
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