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International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology

Inscrypt 2013: Information Security and Cryptology pp 377–394Cite as

One-Time Programs with Limited Memory

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8567))

Abstract

We reinvestigate a notion of one-time programs introduced in the CRYPTO 2008 paper by Goldwasser et al. A one-time program is a device containing a program \(C\), with the property that the program \(C\) can be executed on at most one input. Goldwasser et al. show how to implement one-time programs on devices equipped with special hardware gadgets called one-time memory tokens.

We provide an alternative construction that does not rely on the hardware gadgets. Instead, it is based on the following assumptions: (1) the total amount of data that can leak from the device is bounded, and (2) the total memory on the device (available both to the honest user and to the attacker) is also restricted, which is essentially the model used recently by Dziembowski et al. (TCC 2011, CRYPTO 2011) to construct one-time computable pseudorandom functions and key-evolution schemes.

This work was partly supported by the WELCOME/2010-4/2 grant founded within the framework of the EU Innovative Economy (National Cohesion Strategy) Operational Programme. The European Research Council has provided financial support for this work under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant agreement no CNTM-207908.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the work of Dziembowski et al. [8] the adversary \(\mathcal {A}_{small}\) is used to model the malicious code executed on the device (e.g. a computer virus), while in our case it models the tampering function. While in real life mallware is usually much more powerful than hardware tampering functions, we adopt the model of [8] since we do not see any other natural restriction on the tampering function that would lead to better parameters or the simpler proofs.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

    Konrad Durnoga, Stefan Dziembowski, Tomasz Kazana & Michal Zaja̧c

  2. Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy

    Stefan Dziembowski

Authors
  1. Konrad Durnoga
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  2. Stefan Dziembowski
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  3. Tomasz Kazana
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  4. Michal Zaja̧c
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michal Zaja̧c .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Dongdai Lin

  2. University of Texas, San Antonio, Texas, USA

    Shouhuai Xu

  3. Columbia University, New York, New York, USA

    Moti Yung

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Durnoga, K., Dziembowski, S., Kazana, T., Zaja̧c, M. (2014). One-Time Programs with Limited Memory. In: Lin, D., Xu, S., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8567. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12087-4_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12087-4_24

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-12086-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-12087-4

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