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Equivalence between MAC, WCR and PRF for Blockcipher Based Constructions

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8782))

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Abstract

In FSE’10, Nandi proved a sufficient condition of pseudo random function (PRF) for affine domain extensions (ADE), a wide class of blockcipher based domain extensions. This sufficient condition is satisfied by all known ADE, however, it is not a characterization of PRF. In this paper we completely characterize the ADE and show that weaker security notions message authentication code (MAC) and weakly collision resistant (WCR) are indeed equivalent to PRF.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India, 700108

    Nilanjan Datta & Mridul Nandi

Authors
  1. Nilanjan Datta
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  2. Mridul Nandi
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Information Engineering, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Rm. 808 Ho Sin Hang Engineering Building, Sha Tin, N.T., Hong Kong

    Sherman S. M. Chow

  2. Institute for Infocomm Research, A*STAR, 1 Fusionopolis Way, 138632, Singapore, Singapore

    Joseph K. Liu

  3. Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong, Chow Yei Ching Building, Pokfulam Road,, Hong Kong

    Lucas C. K. Hui

  4. Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong, Chow Yei Ching Building, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong

    Siu Ming Yiu

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Datta, N., Nandi, M. (2014). Equivalence between MAC, WCR and PRF for Blockcipher Based Constructions. In: Chow, S.S.M., Liu, J.K., Hui, L.C.K., Yiu, S.M. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8782. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12475-9_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12475-9_21

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-12474-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-12475-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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