Skip to main content

Concise Bid Optimization Strategies with Multiple Budget Constraints

  • Conference paper
Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 8877))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

A major challenge faced by the marketers attempting to optimize their advertising campaigns is to deal with budget constraints. The problem is even harder in the face of multidimensional budget constraints, particularly in the presence of many decision variables involved, and the interplay among the decision variables through these such constraints. Concise bidding strategies help advertisers deal with this challenge by introducing fewer variables to act on.

In this paper, we study the problem of finding optimal concise bidding strategies for advertising campaigns with multiple budget constraints. Given bid landscapes—i.e., predicted value (e.g., number of clicks) and cost per click for any bid—that are typically provided by ad-serving systems, we optimize the value given budget constraints. In particular, we consider bidding strategies that consist of no more than k different bids for all keywords. For constant k, we provide a PTAS to optimize the profit, whereas for arbitrary k we show how constant-factor approximation can be obtained via a combination of solution enumeration and dependent LP-rounding techniques.

Finally, we evaluate the performance of our algorithms on real datasets in two regimes with 1- and 3-dimensional budget constraint. In the former case where uniform bidding has provable performance guarantee, our algorithm beats the state of the art by an increase of 1% to 6% in the expected number of clicks. This is achieved by only two or three clusters—contrast with the single cluster permitted in uniform bidding. With only three dimensions in the budget constraint (one for total consumption, and another two for enforcing minimal diversity), the gap between the performance of our algorithm and an enhanced version of uniform bidding grows to an average of 5% to 6% (sometimes as high as 9%). Although the details of experiments for the multidimensional budget constraint to the full version of the paper are deferred to the full version of the paper, we report some highlights from the results.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Aggarwal, G., Goel, A., Motwani, R.: Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pp. 1–7 (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Archak, N., Mirrokni, V., Muthukrishnan, S.: Budget optimization for online campaigns with positive carryover effects. In: Goldberg, P.W. (ed.) WINE 2012. LNCS, vol. 7695, pp. 86–99. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Bing Ads. Bing ads intelligence (2013), http://advertise.bingads.microsoft.com/en-us/bingads-downloads/bingads-intelligence

  4. Borgs, C., Chayes, J.T., Immorlica, N., Jain, K., Etesami, O., Mahdian, M.: Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions. In: World Wide Web, pp. 531–540 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Devenur, N.R., Hayes, T.P.: The adwords problem: Online keyword matching with budgeted bidders under random permutations. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pp. 71–78 (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Dobzinski, S., Lavi, R., Nisan, N.: Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. Games and Economic Behavior 74(2), 486–503 (2012)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  7. Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., Schwarz, M.: Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American Economic Review 97(1), 242–259 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Even-Dar, E., Mirrokni, V.S., Muthukrishnan, S., Mansour, Y., Nadav, U.: Bid optimization for broad match ad auctions. In: World Wide Web, pp. 231–240 (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Feldman, J., Henzinger, M., Korula, N., Mirrokni, V.S., Stein, C.: Online stochastic packing applied to display ad allocation. In: de Berg, M., Meyer, U. (eds.) ESA 2010, Part I. LNCS, vol. 6346, pp. 182–194. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Feldman, J., Korula, N., Mirrokni, V., Muthukrishnan, S., Pál, M.: Online ad assignment with free disposal. In: Leonardi, S. (ed.) WINE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5929, pp. 374–385. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Feldman, J., Muthukrishnan, S., Pal, M., Stein, C.: Budget optimization in search-based advertising auctions. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pp. 40–49 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Goel, G., Mirrokni, V.S., Paes Leme, R.: Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope. In: STOC, pp. 107–122 (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Google Support, Google adwords dynamic search ads (2011), http://adwords.blogspot.fr/2011/10/introducing-dynamic-search-ads-beta.html

  14. Google Support. Google adwords automatic bidding tools (2013), http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2470106

  15. Google Support. Traffic estimator (2013), http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6329

  16. Google Support. Using the bid simulator (2013), http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=2470105

  17. Hastad, J.: Clique is hard to approximate within n 1 − ε. Acta Mathematica 182(1) 105–142 (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  18. IAB. Internet advertising bureau 2011 report (2011), http://www.iab.net/media/file/IAB_Internet_Advertising_Revenue_Report_FY_2011.pdf

  19. Mehta, A., Saberi, A., Vazirani, U.V., Vazirani, V.V.: Adwords and generalized online matching. Journal of ACM 54(5) (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Muthukrishnan, S., Pal, M., Svitkina, Z.: Stochastic models for budget optimization in search-based advertising. Algorithmica 58(4), 1022–1044 (2010)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  21. Rusmevichientong, P., Williamson, D.: An adaptive algorithm for selecting profitable keywords for search-based advertising services. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), pp. 260–269 (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  22. Varian, H.: Position auctions. Int. J. Industrial Opt. 25(6), 1163–1178 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  23. Zhou, Y., Chakrabarty, D., Lukose, R.: Budget constrained bidding in keyword auctions and online knapsack problems. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds.) WINE 2008. LNCS, vol. 5385, pp. 566–576. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Asadpour, A., Bateni, M.H., Bhawalkar, K., Mirrokni, V. (2014). Concise Bid Optimization Strategies with Multiple Budget Constraints. In: Liu, TY., Qi, Q., Ye, Y. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8877. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_21

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_21

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-13128-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-13129-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics