Abstract
We introduce a generalization of weighted congestion games in which players are associated with k-dimensional demand vectors and resource costs are k-dimensional functions \(\smash{c : \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^k \to \mathbb{R}}\) of the aggregated demand vector of the players using the resource. Such a cost structure is natural when the cost of a resource depends on different properties of the players’ demands, e.g., total weight, total volume, and total number of items. A complete characterization of the existence of pure Nash equilibria in terms of the resource cost functions for all k ∈ ℕ is given.
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Klimm, M., Schütz, A. (2014). Congestion Games with Higher Demand Dimensions. In: Liu, TY., Qi, Q., Ye, Y. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8877. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_39
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_39
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
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