Abstract
The double auction marketplace usually charges fees to traders to make profits. Although the bidding strategies in double auctions have been widely studied, little work has been done on analysing how market fees can affect bidding strategies, and how the marketplace selects appropriate fees to make profits. In this paper, we will investigate these two problems. Specifically, we choose four typical types of fees, and use a computational learning approach to analyse the Nash equilibrium bidding strategies of traders when different types of fees are charged. In doing so, we draw insights about how different types of market fees can affect the Nash equilibrium bidding strategies. Furthermore, we investigate which type of market fees is the most effective in terms of maximising market profits while keeping traders staying in the marketplace.
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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
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Shi, B. (2014). Bidding with Fees and Setting Effective Fees in a Double Auction Marketplace. In: Pham, DN., Park, SB. (eds) PRICAI 2014: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. PRICAI 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8862. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13560-1_51
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13560-1_51
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-13559-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-13560-1
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