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International Conference on Technologies and Applications of Artificial Intelligence

TAAI 2014: Technologies and Applications of Artificial Intelligence pp 14–25Cite as

Manipulating Information Providers Access to Information in Auctions

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 8916))

Abstract

Information purchasing is a crucial issue that auctioneers have to consider when running auctions, in particular in auction settings where the auctioned item’s value is affected by a common value element. In such settings it is reasonable to assume the existence of a self-interested information provider. The main contribution of the information provider may be the elimination of some uncertainty associated with the common value of the auctioned item. The existence of an information provider does not necessarily impose the use of its services. Moreover, in cases in which the auctioneer decides to purchase information, it is not always beneficial for him to disclose it. In this work, we focus on environment settings where the information that may purchased still involves some uncertainty. The equilibrium analysis is provided with illustrations that highlight some non-intuitive behaviors. In particular, we show that in some cases it is beneficial for the auctioneer to initially limit the level of detail and precision of the information he may purchase. This can be achieved, for example, by limiting the information provider’s access to some of the data required to determine the exact common value. This result is non-intuitive especially in light of the fact that the auctioneer is the one who decides whether or not to use the services of the information provider; hence having the option to purchase better information may seem advantageous.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel

    Shani Alkoby & David Sarne

  2. Department of Computer Science, Ashkelon Academic College, Ashkelon, Israel

    Esther David

Authors
  1. Shani Alkoby
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  2. David Sarne
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  3. Esther David
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, No. 43, Sec. 4, Keelung Rd., Da’an Dist., 106, Taipei City, Taiwan

    Shin-Ming Cheng

  2. Department of Information Management, Tamkang University, No. 151, Yingzhuan Rd., Danshui Dist., 25137, New Taipei City, Taiwan

    Min-Yuh Day

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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Alkoby, S., Sarne, D., David, E. (2014). Manipulating Information Providers Access to Information in Auctions. In: Cheng, SM., Day, MY. (eds) Technologies and Applications of Artificial Intelligence. TAAI 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8916. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13987-6_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13987-6_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-13986-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-13987-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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