Attribution, Temptation, and Expectation: A Formal Framework for Defense-by-Deception in Cyberwarfare

Abstract

Defense-by-deception is an effective technique to address the asymmetry challenges in cyberwarfare. It allows for not only misleading attackers to non-harmful goals but also systematic depletion of attacker resources. In this paper, we developed a game theocratic framework that considersattribution, temptation andexpectation, as the major components for planning a successful deception plan. We developed as a case study a game strategy to proactively deceive remote fingerprinting attackers without causing significant performance degradation to benign clients. We model and analyze the interaction between a fingerprinter and a target as a signaling game. We derive the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles based on the information gain analysis. Based on our game results, we designDeceiveGame, a mechanism to prevent or to significantly slow down fingerprinting attacks. Our performance analysis shows thatDeceiveGame can reduce the probability of success of the fingerprinter significantly, without deteriorating the overall performance of other clients. Beyond the DeceiveGame application, our formal framework can be generally used to synthesize correct-by-construction cyber deception plans against other attacks.