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Successful Profiling Attacks with Different Measurement Environments for Each Phase

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Information Security Applications (WISA 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8909))

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Abstract

Power analysis attacks have received a great deal of attention, because they can be carried out easily than conventional cryptanalysis. Profiling attacks are one of the most efficient attacks among power analysis attacks. However, profiling attacks have the limitation of using the same experimental environment for both the profiling and attacking phases. If two sets of power traces are obtained from different setups, then the attack may not be feasible. We propose a new method to overcome this limitation with different measurement environments using multivariate regression analysis. Our results show that the proposed method can successfully retrieve a secret key using two different types of power traces. Moreover, the success rate is higher than for non-profiling attacks, i.e., Correlation Power Analysis (CPA).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We do not represent DPA Workstation is better than Inspector SCA. Because the SNR can be very varied depends on target device, environmental settings, etc. Therefore, SNR of traces from Inspector SCA can be higher in some case.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Attached Institute of Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, P.O.Box 1, Yuseong, Daejeon, 305-600, Korea

    Yongdae Kim

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  1. Yongdae Kim
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Correspondence to Yongdae Kim .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Pukyong National University, Busan, Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

    Kyung-Hyune Rhee

  2. School of Computer Science and Engineering, Soongsil University, Seoul, Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

    Jeong Hyun Yi

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Kim, Y. (2015). Successful Profiling Attacks with Different Measurement Environments for Each Phase. In: Rhee, KH., Yi, J. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8909. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15087-1_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15087-1_25

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-15086-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-15087-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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