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Cryptanalysis of Ascon

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Book cover Topics in Cryptology –- CT-RSA 2015 (CT-RSA 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9048))

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Abstract

We present a detailed security analysis of the CAESAR candidate Ascon. Amongst others, cube-like, differential and linear cryptanalysis are used to evaluate the security of Ascon. Our results are practical key-recovery attacks on round-reduced versions of Ascon-128, where the initialization is reduced to 5 out of 12 rounds. Theoretical key-recovery attacks are possible for up to 6 rounds of initialization. Moreover, we present a practical forgery attack for 3 rounds of the finalization, a theoretical forgery attack for 4 rounds finalization and zero-sum distinguishers for the full 12-round Ascon permutation. Besides, we present the first results regarding linear cryptanalysis of Ascon, improve upon the results of the designers regarding differential cryptanalysis, and prove bounds on the minimum number of (linearly and differentially) active S-boxes for the Ascon permutation.

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Correspondence to Christoph Dobraunig .

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Dobraunig, C., Eichlseder, M., Mendel, F., Schläffer, M. (2015). Cryptanalysis of Ascon . In: Nyberg, K. (eds) Topics in Cryptology –- CT-RSA 2015. CT-RSA 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9048. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16715-2_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16715-2_20

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-16714-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-16715-2

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