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International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience

ISPEC 2015: Information Security Practice and Experience pp 235–249Cite as

Combined Cache Timing Attacks and Template Attacks on Stream Cipher MUGI

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9065))

Abstract

The stream cipher MUGI was proposed by Hitachi, Ltd. in 2002 and it was specified as ISO/IEC 18033-4 for keystream generation. Assuming that noise-free cache timing measurements are possible, we give the cryptanalysis of MUGI under the cache attack model. Our simulation results show that we can reduce the computation complexity of recovering all the 1216-bits internal state of MUGI to about O(276) when it is implemented in processors with 64-byte cache line. The attack reveals some new inherent weaknesses of MUGI’s structure. The weaknesses can also be used to conduct a noiseless template attack of O(260.51) computation complexity to restore the state of MUGI. And then combining these two attacks we can conduct a key-recovery attack on MUGI with about O(230) computation complexity. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that the analysis of cache timing attacks and template attacks are applied to full version of MUGI and that these two classes of attacks are combined to attack some cipher. Moreover, the combination can be used to improve the error-tolerance capability of each attack. If each measurement has one additional error, the key-recovery attack will take about O(250) computation complexity.

This work was supported by the National Grand Fundamental Research 973 Programs of China(Grant No. 2013CB338002, 2011CB302400),the programs of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61303258, 60833008, 60603018, 61173134, 91118006, 61272476).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Shaoyu Du, Zhenqi Li & Bin Zhang

  2. State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Bin Zhang

  3. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Dongdai Lin

  4. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Shaoyu Du

Authors
  1. Shaoyu Du
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  2. Zhenqi Li
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  3. Bin Zhang
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  4. Dongdai Lin
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Shaoyu Du .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Malaga, Malaga, Spain

    Javier Lopez

  2. Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore, Singapore

    Yongdong Wu

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Du, S., Li, Z., Zhang, B., Lin, D. (2015). Combined Cache Timing Attacks and Template Attacks on Stream Cipher MUGI. In: Lopez, J., Wu, Y. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9065. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17533-1_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17533-1_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-17532-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-17533-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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