Abstract
It is widely assumed that the normative systems in civil law countries encompass not only the norms explicitly stated in statutory texts but also the so-called normative consequence s of the former norms. The concept of ‘normative consequence ’ is to a significant extent independent of the concept of logic al consequence because some, if not most, legal inference schemes are non-deductive; moreover, some valid logic al inference patterns are perceived as counterintuitive by lawyers. Our research problem is to determine how the link between the wording of statutes and the eventual legal effects is established. Our thesis is that it is achieved by means of legal argumentation, and we provide an exact, semi-formal theory–the argumentation framework for legislation (AFLEG )–to represent this process. The emphasis is on the aspect of legislative discourse that concerns the anticipated application of provisions drafted by the legislator. The proposal provides a middle ground between fully formalized reconstructions of normative systems on the one hand and classical informal argumentative approaches to the subject on the other hand.
The authors would like to thank all the contributors to the present volume for their work, which was an invaluable source of inspiration.
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Notes
- 1.
In the contemporary analyses of the debate, and especially of Dworkin’s standpoint, it is emphasized that there is the possibility of distinguishing between two versions of his legal philosophy–the early one, which is best presented in Taking Rights Seriously and the later one, which is presented in Law’s Empire (Leiter 2007). However, Dworkin questions the possibility of presenting his theory in two versions (Dworkin 2006, 233).
- 2.
The concept of systemic validity can be characterised by the following criteria: “a rule belongs to the legal system if: (a) a rule is enacted according to the rules valid in the legal system and thus has come into force; (b) a rule has not been formally repealed (“derogated”); (c) a rule is not inconsistent with the rules valid in the legal system ; (d) if a rule is inconsistent with any rule valid in the legal system then either a rule is not treated as invalid according to the rules about conflict between legal rules or a rule is interpreted in such a way as to eliminate the inconsistency in question” (Wróblewski 1980, 10). In the later version of his theory, Wróblewski introduced an additional criterion: “a rule is an acknowledged consequence of the rules valid in the legal system ” (Wróblewski 1992, 77).
- 3.
Wróblewski claims that logic al consequences should fulfil two conditions: (a) they are based on three theses of formal calculi, which are “interpreted” (in the logic al meaning of this term) by the expressions occurring in the legal norms or by these norms; (b) they are claimed to be valid like the norms they derive from (Wróblewski 1980, 12).
- 4.
Notwithstanding this, Wróblewski emphasises that for the construction of such a model it is essential to make two assumptions: “(a) there exists a limited set of interpretative directives accepted in a given system; (b) the consequences of norms built by means of these directives constitute valid norms.” (Wróblewski 1980, 13–14). The second condition is trivial and fulfilled in every legal system , but the first one meets considerable obstacles caused by the heterogeneous character and the conflicting nature of the set of interpretative directives.
- 5.
Woleński used the symbol No in this context because his work was published in Polish and the Polish word for ‘obligation’ (in this meaning) is ‘nakaz’.
- 6.
These features are elements of a theory of the so-called rational norm-giver, which was very influential in Polish legal theory in the second half of the twentieth century.
- 7.
However, at least certain inferences warranted by (classical) notion of logic al consequence seem to be troubling from the point of view of descriptive adequacy as regards the actual reasoning on consequence of statutes. Let us mention the three laws of classical logic :
-
(a)
ex falsum quidlibet: \((p \wedge \neg p) \rightarrow q\) (that is, contradiction implies an arbitrary sentence). Obviously, no lawyer would accept this kind of consequence even in case of plain and insuperable contradiction between two provisions in a statute;
-
(b)
Attaching of an alternative: p → (p ∨ q). This law lad to formulation of the famous Ross’ paradox in deontic logic . Although it does not lead to actual antinomy in the normative system, this type of inference seems to be pragmatically fallacious in the context of legal discourse;
-
(c)
Strengthening of antecedent: (p → q) → ((p ∧ r) → q). The critique of adequacy of this law was one of the factors that led to emergence of nonmonotonic logic s applied to legal domain.
-
(a)
- 8.
The literature on the concept of facts and / or states of affairs is too vast to be described here. For recent contributions in the field of legal theory, see Hage 2016 (in this volume).
- 9.
For the sake of readability, we will not use standard formal notation of predicate symbols, but full expressions of predicates in square brackets. For instance, the sentence “There exists a cat” will not be represented by \(\exists _{x}\) C(x), but by \(\exists _{x}\) [cat] (x).
- 10.
We adopt this solution in order to avoid problems concerning the complete formalization of plain, natural language. Arguably this is not possible with the use of the first-order (deontic) language, which we adopt here as the subject level language.
- 11.
Journal of Laws 2014.121, consolidated text as amended.
- 12.
Because of the numerous legislative changes, in the example we use the text from 2011, that is, its wording from before the introduction of the VAT Project. It should be emphasized, however, that this particular institution has been construed and applied exactly in this way since the analysed regulation came into force.
- 13.
We do not represent it here for the sake of conciseness and due to the fact that the instantiation of RBAS is obvious in this theory.
- 14.
The asterisk (*) indicates that this version of the provision is taken from a draft of a statute and not from the valid law.
- 15.
Invoice received.
- 16.
Invoice not received.
- 17.
This is an entity registered as conducting professional lobbying activities.
- 18.
Art.1 (…)2. The principle of the common system of VAT entails the application to goods and services of a general tax on consumption exactly proportional to the price of the goods and services; however, many transactions take place in the production and distribution process before the stage at which the tax is charged. On each transaction, VAT, calculated on the price of the goods or services at the rate applicable to such goods or services, shall be chargeable after deduction of the amount of VAT borne directly by the various cost components. The common system of VAT shall be applied up to and including the retail trade stage.And the points from the preamble: “(30) In order to preserve neutrality of VAT, the rates applied by Member States should be such as to enable, as a general rule, deduction of the VAT applied at the preceding stage. (34) However, such a reduction in the VAT rate is not without risk for the smooth functioning of the internal market and for tax neutrality. (…)” (Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, Official Journal of the European Union L 347/1).
- 19.
Again, we do not represent the instantiation of RBAS due to its straightforwardness.
- 20.
The Consumer Rights Act of 30 May 2014, Journal of Laws 2014, 827.
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Araszkiewicz, M., Płeszka, K. (2015). The Concept of Normative Consequence and Legislative Discourse. In: Araszkiewicz, M., Płeszka, K. (eds) Logic in the Theory and Practice of Lawmaking. Legisprudence Library, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19575-9_10
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