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Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy

ACISP 2015: Information Security and Privacy pp 251–269Cite as

Constant-Round Leakage-Resilient Zero-Knowledge Argument for NP from the Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9144))

Abstract

In this paper, we study the design of constant-round or even 3-round zero-knowledge protocols for all NP languages resistant against side channel attack. Garg, Jain, and Sahai firstly formalize a meaningful definition of \((1+\epsilon )\)-leakage-resilient zero-knowledge(LRZK), and give a construction of \((1+\epsilon )\)-LRZK, for every constant \(\epsilon >0\). Then, with Barak’s non-black-box (NBB) simulation technique, Pandey presents the first construction of constant-round LRZK satisfying the ideal requirement \(\epsilon =0\). In this paper, we focus on the construction of constant-round (especially 3-round) LRZK protocols for all NP languages satisfying the ideal requirement \(\epsilon =0\), by means of other techniques. Specially, based on extended Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption over bilinear groups, we obtain a constant-round LRZK argument for Hamiltonian Cycle (HC) problem, and a 3-round LRZK arguments for circuit satisfiability, which is the first 3-round LRZK protocol for NP.

This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61003276) and the Strategic Priority Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences (Grant No. Y2W0012203).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Tingting Zhang, Hongda Li & Guifang Huang

  2. Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Tingting Zhang, Hongda Li & Guifang Huang

  3. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Tingting Zhang, Hongda Li & Guifang Huang

Authors
  1. Tingting Zhang
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  2. Hongda Li
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  3. Guifang Huang
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Correspondence to Tingting Zhang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

    Ernest Foo

  2. Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

    Douglas Stebila

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Zhang, T., Li, H., Huang, G. (2015). Constant-Round Leakage-Resilient Zero-Knowledge Argument for NP from the Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption. In: Foo, E., Stebila, D. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9144. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19962-7_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19962-7_15

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-19961-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-19962-7

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