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RTDA: A Novel Reusable Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Wireless Spectrum Management

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Abstract

In the secondary spectrum market, more and more primary users (PUs) release their idle spectrum to secondary users (SUs). While some of the existing auction mechanisms are truthful, few of them emphasize achieving a high usage rate. Even the SUs get the channel they require, the spectrum resource is still wasted in the spare time. In this paper, we propose a Reusable Truthful Double Auction (RTDA) mechanism for spectrum management, which considers temporal reuse and improve the usage rate significantly. Mathematical inference and game theory is used to prove that RTDA is economic-robust. The simulation results show that RTDA significantly improves the spectrum usage rate. In certain scenario, the usage rate can reach up to \(100\%\).

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Correspondence to Lei Wang .

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Tian, F., Li, D., Li, S., Wang, L., Jin, N., Sun, L. (2015). RTDA: A Novel Reusable Truthful Double Auction Mechanism for Wireless Spectrum Management. In: Wang, Y., Xiong, H., Argamon, S., Li, X., Li, J. (eds) Big Data Computing and Communications. BigCom 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9196. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22047-5_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22047-5_2

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-22046-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-22047-5

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