Skip to main content

Power Trading Coordination in Smart Grids Using Dynamic Learning and Coalitional Game Theory

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Book cover Quantitative Evaluation of Systems (QEST 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 9259))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 758 Accesses

Abstract

In traditional power distribution models, consumers acquire power from the central distribution unit, while “micro-grids” in a smart power grid can also trade power between themselves. In this paper, we investigate the problem of power trading coordination among such micro-grids. Each micro-grid has a surplus or a deficit quantity of power to transfer or to acquire, respectively. A coalitional game theory based algorithm is devised to form a set of coalitions. The coordination among micro-grids determines the amount of power to transfer over each transmission line in order to serve all micro-grids in demand by the supplier micro-grids and the central distribution unit with the purpose of minimizing the amount of dissipated power during generation and transfer. We propose two dynamic learning processes: one to form a coalition structure and one to provide the formed coalitions with the highest power saving. Numerical results show that dissipated power in the proposed cooperative smart grid is only \(10\,\%\) of that in traditional power distribution networks.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    This circuit is suitable for analysing its symmetrical three-phase operation.

References

  1. Machowski, J., Bialek, J.W., Bumby, J.R.: Power System Dynamics: Stability and Control, 2nd edn. Wiley, New York (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Coster, E.J.: Distribution Grid Operation Including Distributed Generation. Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Ochoa, L., Harrison, G.: Minimizing energy losses: Optimal accommodation and smart operation of renewable distributed generation. IEEE Trans. Power Sys. 26(1), 198–205 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Tenti, P., Costabeber, A., Mattavelli, P., Trombetti, D.: Distribution loss minimization by token ring control of power electronic interfaces in residential microgrids. IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron 59(10), 3817–3826 (2012)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Saad, W., Han, Z., Poor, H.: Coalitional game theory for cooperative micro-grid distribution networks. In: IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops (ICC), pp. 1–5, Kyoto, June 2011

    Google Scholar 

  6. Wei, C., Fadlullah, Z., Kato, N., Takeuchi, V.: GT-CFS: a game theoretic coalition formulation strategy for reducing power loss in micro grids. IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Sys. 25(9), 2307–2317 (2014)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. Mohsenian-Rad, A.-H., Wong, V., Jatskevich, J., Schober, R., Leon-Garcia, A.: Autonomous demand-side management based on game-theoretic energy consumption scheduling for the future smart grid. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid 1(3), 320–331 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Vytelingum, P., Ramchurn, S., Voice, T., Rogers, A., Jennings, N.: Agent-based modeling of smart-grid market operations. In: IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, pp. 1–8, Detroit, July 2011

    Google Scholar 

  10. Wang, Y., Saad, W., Han, Z., Poor, H., Basar, T.: A game-theoretic approach to energy trading in the smart grid. IEEE Trans. Smart Grid 5(3), 1439–1450 (2014)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Shams, F., Luise, M.: Basics of coalitional games with applications to communications and networking. EURASIP J. Wirel. Commun. Networks 1, 2013 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Saad, W., Han, Z., Poor, H., Basar, T.: Game-theoretic methods for the smart grid: an overview of microgrid systems, demand-side management, and smart grid communications. IEEE Signal Process. Mag. 29(5), 86–105 (2012)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Shapley, L.S.: A value for \(n\)-person games. contribution to the theory of games. Ann. Math. Stud. 2, 28 (1953)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Kakutani, S.: A generalization of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. Duke Math. J. 8(3), 457–459 (1941)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  15. Yahyasoltani, N.: Dynamic learning and resource management under uncertainties for smart grid and cognitive radio networks. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Computer Engineering, University of Minnesota, USA (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Galli, S., Scaglione, A., Wang, Z.: For the grid and through the grid: the role of power line communications in the smart grid. Proc. IEEE 99(6), 92–951 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgement

This work is supported by the EU project QUANTICOL, 600708.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Farshad Shams .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Shams, F., Tribastone, M. (2015). Power Trading Coordination in Smart Grids Using Dynamic Learning and Coalitional Game Theory. In: Campos, J., Haverkort, B. (eds) Quantitative Evaluation of Systems. QEST 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9259. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22264-6_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22264-6_4

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-22263-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-22264-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics