Skip to main content

Probabilistic Belief Contraction: Considerations on Epistemic Entrenchment, Probability Mixtures and KL Divergence

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
AI 2015: Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 9457))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Probabilistic belief contraction is an operation that takes a probability distribution P representing a belief state along with an input sentence a representing some information to be removed from this belief state, and outputs a new probability distribution \(P^-_a\). The contracted belief state \(P^-_a\) can be represented as a mixture of two states: the original belief state P, and the resultant state \(P^*_{\lnot a}\) of revising P by \(\lnot a\). Crucial to this mixture is the mixing factor \(\epsilon \) which determines the proportion of P and \(P^*_{\lnot a}\) that are used in this process in a uniform manner. Ideas from information theory such as the principle of minimum cross-entropy have previously been used to motivate the choice of the probabilistic contraction operation. Central to this principle is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. In an earlier work we had shown that the KL divergence of \(P^-_a\) from P is fully determined by a function whose only argument is the mixing factor \(\epsilon \). In this paper we provide a way of interpreting \(\epsilon \) in terms of a belief ranking mechanism such as epistemic entrenchment that is in consonance with this result. We also provide a much needed justification for why the mixing factor \(\epsilon \) must be used in a uniform fashion by showing that the minimal divergence of \(P^-_{a}\) from P is achieved only when uniformity is respected.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    This principle is subject to debate and different interpretations; see for instance (Rott and Pagnucco 1999; Arló-Costa and Levi 2006). It has also been employed to provide accounts of iterated belief contraction, e.g. in (Nayak et al. 2007).

  2. 2.

    Sentences that have a probability of 1.

  3. 3.

    \(P^+_a\) is simply Bayesian conditioning.

  4. 4.

    One might wonder if the value of \(\epsilon \) is prefixed. We take the view that it is not, and is indeed sensitive to the information a that is being removed.

  5. 5.

    Strictly speaking Gärdenfors epistemic entrenchment is completely relational, and using ordinals in this way is used for convenience only. Our approach may be taken to be closer to Spohn’s degree of beliefs modeled via Ordinal Conditional Functions (Spohn 1988).

  6. 6.

    We assume that \(a \not \equiv k\). The special case when the agent discards all that it believes will need special treatment, and will digress us to the discussion of special forms of belief contraction such as pick contraction and bunch contraction that are not directly relevant to the main contribution of this paper.

  7. 7.

    KL divergence is often defined only when \(Q(w) = 0\) implies \(P(w) = 0\), obviating the need for special conventions such as \(0 / 0 = 0\).

  8. 8.

    This is the same as saying it is not the case that \(Q(\omega ) = \epsilon \cdot P(\omega )\) for all \(\omega \in [k]\).

  9. 9.

    Strictly speaking relations, but we make appropriatete mental adjustments here.

  10. 10.

    We note here in passing that even if a is assigned the same epistemic rank by the two ranking functions, and hence the revised belief sets \(K^*_{\lnot a}\) and \(K^{*'}_{\lnot a}\) are the same, the revised probabilistic states \(P^*_{\lnot a}\) and \(P^{*'}_{\lnot a}\) could be different. Support for this view can be obtained based on the accounts of probabilistic belief revision developed in (Chhogyal et al. 2014).

References

  • Alchourrón, C.E., Gärdenfors, P., Makinson, D.: On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision functions. J. Symb. Log. 50(2), 510–530 (1985)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Arló-Costa, H.L., Levi, I.: Contraction: on the decision-theoretical origins of minimal change and entrenchment. Synthese 152(1), 129–154 (2006)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Chhogyal, K., Nayak, A.C., Sattar, A.: On the KL divergence of probability mixtures for belief contraction. In: Proceedings of the 38th German Conference on Artificial Intelligence (KI-2015) (to appear 2015)

    Google Scholar 

  • Chhogyal, K., Nayak, A., Schwitter, R., Sattar, A.: Probabilistic belief revision via imaging. In: Pham, D.-N., Park, S.-B. (eds.) PRICAI 2014. LNCS, vol. 8862, pp. 694–707. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  • Chhogyal, K., Nayak, A. C., Zhuang, Z., Sattar, A.: Probabilistic belief contraction using argumentation. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 25–31, 2015, pp. 2854–2860 (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  • Cover, T.M., Thomas, J.A.: Elements of Information Theory. John Wiley & Sons, New York (1991)

    Book  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Dubois, D., Lang, J., Prade, H.: Possibilistic logic. In: Gabbay, D.M., Hogger, C.J., Robinson, J.A. (eds.) Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, vol. 3, pp. 439–513. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P.: The dynamics of belief: contractions and revisions of probability functions. Topoi 5(1), 29–37 (1986)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P.: Knowledge in Flux. Modelling the Dymanics of Epistemic States. MIT Press, Cambridge (1988)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Grove, A.: Two modellings for theory change. J. Philos. Logic 17(2), 157–170 (1988)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Hansson, S.O.: Belief contraction without recovery. Stud. Logica 50(2), 251–260 (1991)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Kern-Isberner, G.: Linking iterated belief change operations to nonmonotonic reasoning. In: Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference, KR 2008, pp. 166–176 (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  • Kullback, S., Leibler, R.A.: On information and sufficiency. Ann. Math. Stat. 22, 79–86 (1951)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Levi, I.: Truth, faillibility and the growth of knowledge in language, logic and method. Boston Stud. Philos. Sci. N.Y., NY 31, 153–174 (1983)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nayak, A.C.: Iterated belief change based on epistemic entrenchment. Erkenntnis 41, 353–390 (1994)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Nayak, A.C., Goebel, R., Orgun, M.A.: Iterated belief contraction from first principles. In: IJCAI 2007, Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Hyderabad, India, January 6–12, 2007, pp. 2568–2573 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  • Potyka, N., Beierle, C., Kern-Isberner, G.: Changes of relational probabilistic belief states and their computation under optimum entropy semantics. In: Timm, I.J., Thimm, M. (eds.) KI 2013. LNCS, vol. 8077, pp. 176–187. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Ramachandran, R., Ramer, A., Nayak, A.C.: Probabilistic belief contraction. Mind. Mach. 22(4), 325–351 (2012)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rott, H., Pagnucco, M.: Severe withdrawal (and recovery). J. Philos. Logic 28(5), 501–547 (1999)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Spohn, W.: Ordinal conditional functions: a dynamic theory of epistemic states. In: Harper, W., Skryms, B. (eds.) Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, II’, Kluwer, pp. 105–134 (1988)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kinzang Chhogyal .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Chhogyal, K., Nayak, A., Sattar, A. (2015). Probabilistic Belief Contraction: Considerations on Epistemic Entrenchment, Probability Mixtures and KL Divergence. In: Pfahringer, B., Renz, J. (eds) AI 2015: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. AI 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9457. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26350-2_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26350-2_10

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-26349-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-26350-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics