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Secure Implementation of Stream Cipher: Trivium

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Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications (SECITC 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9522))

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Abstract

Trivium is a hardware oriented synchronous stream cipher designed by Christophe De Cannière and Bart Preneel [7]. Trivium is one of the eSTREAM final portfolio cipher. Regardless of the security of the cipher in theory, implementation attacks like Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack [10, 12, 18] and Fault attack [9] on Trivium were observed. DPA attack of Trivium exploits the re-synchronization phase of the algorithm to reveal the key.

In this paper, we analyse various implementation techniques as countermeasures for Trivium stream cipher against DPA attack. First, we present Threshold Implementation (TI) of Trivium using random mask value. Second, we propose algorithm level changes (Modified Trivium) to counteract the attack, which introduces negligible resource overhead to the implementation. Third, random accelerator concept is introduced for parallel architecture along with combined techniques of TI and algorithm level changes to further increase the attack complexity. Finally, we present comparative study on the performance of Trivium for the proposed techniques.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Modified Trivium, Key:0x9999999999, Initialization vector: Random. Every seventh bit is incorporated as one in the loading of initialization phase.

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Acknowledgments

This Research work was funded by Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), Govt. of India under the grant 12-R&D-IMS-5.01.0204. We would like to thank our team members for their assistance in this work and anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hardware Security Research Group, Society for Electronic Transactions and Security, Chennai, India

    Dillibabu Shanmugam & Suganya Annadurai

Authors
  1. Dillibabu Shanmugam
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  2. Suganya Annadurai
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Correspondence to Dillibabu Shanmugam .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Bucharest, Romania

    Ion Bica

  2. Departement d Informatique, Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris, France

    David Naccache

  3. Advanced Technologies Institute , University Politehnica of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania

    Emil Simion

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Shanmugam, D., Annadurai, S. (2015). Secure Implementation of Stream Cipher: Trivium. In: Bica, I., Naccache, D., Simion, E. (eds) Innovative Security Solutions for Information Technology and Communications. SECITC 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9522. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27179-8_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27179-8_18

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-27178-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-27179-8

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