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A New Approach to Efficient Revocable Attribute-Based Anonymous Credentials

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Cryptography and Coding (IMACC 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9496))

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Abstract

Recently, a new paradigm to construct very efficient multi-show attribute-based anonymous credential (ABC) systems has been introduced in Asiacrypt’14. Here, structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes (SPS-EQ-\(\mathcal {R}\)), a novel flavor of structure-preserving signatures (SPS), and randomizable polynomial commitments are elegantly combined to yield the first ABC systems with O(1) credential size and O(1) communication bandwidth during issuing and showing. It has, however, been left open to present a full-fledged revocable multi-show attribute-based anonymous credential (RABC) system based on the aforementioned paradigm. As revocation is a highly desired and important feature when deploying ABC systems in a practical setting, this is an interesting challenge.

To this end, we propose an RABC system which builds upon the aforementioned ABC system, preserves its nice asymptotic properties and is in particular entirely practical. Our approach is based on universal accumulators, which nicely fit to the underlying paradigm. Thereby, in contrast to existing accumulator-based revocation approaches, we do not require complex zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (ZKPKs) to demonstrate the possession of a non-membership witness for the accumulator. This is in part due to the nice rerandomization properties of SPS-EQ-\(\mathcal {R}\). Thus, this makes the entire RABC system conceptually simple, efficient and represents a novel direction in credential revocation. We also propose a game-based security model for RABC systems and prove the security of our construction in this model. Finally, to demonstrate the value of our novel approach, we carefully adapt an efficient existing universal accumulator approach (as applied within Microsoft’s U-Prove) to our setting and compare the two revocation approaches when used with the same underlying ABC system.

The authors have been supported by EU Horizon 2020 through project Prismacloud (GA No. 644962) and by EU FP7 through project MATTHEW (GA No. 610436). An extended version of this paper is available in the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We, however, note that the efficiency of our scheme comes at the cost of more complex proofs.

  2. 2.

    We stress that in our context pseudonyms are solely used for revocation and not for showing purposes (as e.g., in the model of [14]) and thus one might call ours revocation pseudonyms (but we simply call them pseudonyms henceforth).

  3. 3.

    Such a witness is basically a consistently randomized commitment (by using \(\rho \)) to \(\overline{\mathbb {A}'}\).

  4. 4.

    To ensure the authenticity of the rerandomized revocation information, we require users to prove knowledge of the randomizer used for randomizing the original accumulator and for proof-technical reasons we require the user to prove knowledge of \(\log _Q C_3\).

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. IAIK, Graz University of Technology, Graz, Austria

    David Derler, Christian Hanser & Daniel Slamanig

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  1. David Derler
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  2. Christian Hanser
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Correspondence to David Derler .

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  1. University College London, Cambridge, United Kingdom

    Jens Groth

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Derler, D., Hanser, C., Slamanig, D. (2015). A New Approach to Efficient Revocable Attribute-Based Anonymous Credentials. In: Groth, J. (eds) Cryptography and Coding. IMACC 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9496. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27239-9_4

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