Abstract
In 2009, Heninger and Shacham presented an algorithm using the Hensel’s lemma for reconstructing the prime factors of the modulus \(N = r_1r_2\). This algorithm computes the prime factors of N in polynomial time, with high probability, assuming that a fraction greater than or equal to 59 % random bits of its primes \(r_1\) and \(r_2\) is given. In this paper, we present the analysis of Hensel’s lemma for a multiprime modulus \(N = \prod ^u_{i=1}r_i\) (for \(u\ge 2\)) and we generalise the Heninger and Shacham’s algorithm to determine the minimum fraction of random bits of its prime factors that is sufficient to factor N in polynomial time with high probability.
R.C. Villena—Supported by CAPES, Brazil.
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- 1.
Basic RSA is when the modulus N is product of two primes.
- 2.
Multi-prime RSA is a generalization of the Basic RSA where the modulus N is the product of two or more primes.
- 3.
N is the product of u primes with the same bit length, as in the Basic RSA.
- 4.
It is an algorithm to factor an integer N with a very good performance.
- 5.
It is an algorithm to compute a non-trivial factor of N.
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Acknowledgment
We thank anonymous referees who pointed out the work by Kogure et al. [9].
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Terada, R., Villena, R.C. (2015). Factoring a Multiprime Modulus N with Random Bits. In: Desmedt, Y. (eds) Information Security. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7807. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27659-5_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27659-5_13
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