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Differential Factors Revisited: Corrected Attacks on PRESENT and SERPENT

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Book cover Lightweight Cryptography for Security and Privacy (LightSec 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9542))

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Abstract

Differential factors, which prevent the attacker to distinguish some of the guessed keys corresponding to an active S-box during a differential attack on a block cipher, are recently introduced at Lightsec 2014 and used to reduce the time complexities of the previous differential-linear attacks on Serpent. Key recovery attacks generally consists of two parts: Key guess using the distinguisher and exhaustive search on the remaining key bits. Thus, we show that differential factors can reduce the time complexity of the former and increase the latter since the attacker does not need to guess the keys which cannot be distinguished. As an example for the latter, we show that the best known differential attack on Present overlooked its six differential factors and the corrected attack actually requires a time complexity increased by a factor of 64. Moreover, we show that differential factors also reduce data complexity of the differential attacks since less number of pairs are required to distinguish the correct key when the key space is reduced. This reduction in data complexity also reduces the time complexity. By using Serpent’s differential factors, we further reduce the data and time complexity of the differential-linear attacks on this cipher to obtain the best attacks.

C. Tezcan—This work was supported by The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) under the grant 115E447 titled “Quasi-Differential Factors and Time Complexity of Block Cipher Attacks”. Part of this work was done when the author was visiting Department of Electrical Engineering, ESAT/COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

    Cihangir Tezcan

  2. CYDES Laboratory, Department of Cyber Security, Institute of Informatics, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

    Cihangir Tezcan

  3. Department of Cryptography, Institute of Applied Mathematics, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

    Cihangir Tezcan

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  1. Cihangir Tezcan
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Correspondence to Cihangir Tezcan .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bremen and DFKI, Bremen, Germany

    Tim Güneysu

  2. Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Gregor Leander

  3. Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Amir Moradi

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Tezcan, C. (2016). Differential Factors Revisited: Corrected Attacks on PRESENT and SERPENT. In: Güneysu, T., Leander, G., Moradi, A. (eds) Lightweight Cryptography for Security and Privacy. LightSec 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9542. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29078-2_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29078-2_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-29077-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-29078-2

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