Abstract
Hardware Trojans have emerged as a security threat to many critical systems. In particular, malicious hardware components can be inserted at the foundry for implementing hidden backdoors to leak secret information. In this paper, we present a new method to partition the circuit under test into blocks in order to obtain different side-channel signatures per chip. Each signature indicates which block is off or on in terms of the dynamic power (switching activity). As a result, there are different co-existing decisions to more precisely detect the Trojan instead of one decision resulting from one side-channel signature. Moreover, this method detects in which block the Trojan exists. AES was used as an example to be divided into blocks. Sakura-G was used as an implementation target. The obtained results give four decisions to enhance Trojan existence and position. This paper also presents a methodology for Trojan detection using a cryptographic protocol to secure the detection process.
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Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the European Commission through the ICT program under contract FP7-ICT-2011-317930 HINT. The authors would like to thank Driss Aboulkassimi and David Cambon for their help in this work.
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Abdellatif, K.M., Cornesse, C., Fournier, J., Robisson, B. (2016). New Partitioning Approach for Hardware Trojan Detection Using Side-Channel Measurements. In: Bonato, V., Bouganis, C., Gorgon, M. (eds) Applied Reconfigurable Computing. ARC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9625. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30481-6_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30481-6_14
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