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ICISC 2015

ICISC 2015: Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2015 pp 20–35Cite as

On the Security of the Schnorr Signature Scheme and DSA Against Related-Key Attacks

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9558))

Abstract

In the ordinary security model for signature schemes, we consider an adversary that may forge a signature on a new message using only his knowledge of other valid message and signature pairs. To take into account side channel attacks such as tampering or fault-injection attacks, Bellare and Kohno (Eurocrypt 2003) formalized related-key attacks (RKA), where stronger adversaries are considered. In RKA for signature schemes, the adversary can also manipulate the signing key and obtain signatures for the modified key. This paper considers RKA security of two established signature schemes: the Schnorr signature scheme and (a well-known variant of) DSA. First, we show that these signature schemes are secure against a weak notion of RKA. Second, we demonstrate that, on the other hand, neither the Schnorr signature scheme nor DSA achieves the standard notion of RKA security, by showing concrete attacks on these. Lastly, we show that a slight modification of both the Schnorr signature scheme and (the considered variant of) DSA yields fully RKA secure schemes.

J.C.N. Schuldt—Supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15K16006.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan

    Hiraku Morita & Tetsu Iwata

  2. National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Tokyo, Japan

    Hiraku Morita, Jacob C. N. Schuldt, Takahiro Matsuda & Goichiro Hanaoka

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  1. Hiraku Morita
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  2. Jacob C. N. Schuldt
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  3. Takahiro Matsuda
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  4. Goichiro Hanaoka
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  5. Tetsu Iwata
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Correspondence to Hiraku Morita .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon, Gyeonggi, Korea (Republic of)

    Soonhak Kwon

  2. UNIST, Ulsan, Korea (Republic of)

    Aaram Yun

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Morita, H., Schuldt, J.C.N., Matsuda, T., Hanaoka, G., Iwata, T. (2016). On the Security of the Schnorr Signature Scheme and DSA Against Related-Key Attacks. In: Kwon, S., Yun, A. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2015. ICISC 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9558. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30840-1_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30840-1_2

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