Skip to main content

Wardrop Equilibrium for Networks with the BPR Latency Function

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Book cover Discrete Optimization and Operations Research (DOOR 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 9869))

Abstract

This paper considers a network comprised of parallel routes with the Bureau of Public Road (BPR) latency function and suggests an optimal distribution method for incoming traffic flow. The authors analytically derive a system of equations defining the optimal distribution of the incoming flow with minimum social costs, as well as a corresponding system of equations for the Wardrop equilibrium in this network. In particular, the Wardrop equilibrium is applied to the competition model with rational consumers who use the carriers with minimal cost, where cost is equal to the price for service plus the waiting time for the service. Finally, the social costs under the equilibrium and under the optimal distribution are compared. It is shown that the price of anarchy can be infinitely large in the model with strategic pricing.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. Traffic Assignment Manual. U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C (1964)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Altman, E., Boulogne, T., El-Azouzi, R., Jimànez, T., Wynter, L.: A survey onnetworking games in telecommunications. Comput. Oper. Res. 33, 286–311 (2006)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Correa, J.R., Stier-Moses, N.E.: Wardrop Equilibria. In: Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science, pp. 1–12 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Dumrauf, D., Gairing, M.: Price of anarchy for polynomial wardrop games. In: Spirakis, P.G., Mavronicolas, M., Kontogiannis, S.C. (eds.) WINE 2006. LNCS, vol. 4286, pp. 319–330. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Gairing, M., Monien, B., Tiemann, K.: Routing (Un-) splittable flow in games with player-specific linear latency functions. In: Bugliesi, M., Preneel, B., Sassone, V., Wegener, I. (eds.) ICALP 2006. LNCS, vol. 4051, pp. 501–512. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Hammalainen, R., Luoma, J., Saarinen, E.: On the importance of behavioral operationalresearch: the case of understanding and communicating about dynamicsystems. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 228(3), 623–634 (2013)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  7. Karakostas, G., Kim, T., Viglas, A., Xia, H.: On the degradation of performance for traffic networks with oblivious users. Transp. Res. Part B Methodol. 45, 364–371 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Koutsoupias, E., Papadimitriou, C.: Worst-case equilibria. In: Proceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, pp. 404–413 (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Mazalov, V., Monien, B., Schoppmann, F., Tiemann, K.: Wardrop equilibria and price of stability for bottleneck games with splittable traffic. In: Spirakis, P.G., Mavronicolas, M., Kontogiannis, S.C. (eds.) WINE 2006. LNCS, vol. 4286, pp. 331–342. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Mazalov, V., Melnik, A.: Equilibrium prices and flows in the passenger traffic problem. Int. Game Theory Rev. 18(1), 1–19 (2016)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  11. Monderer, D., Shapley, L.S.: Potential Games. Games Econ. Behav. 14, 124–143 (1996)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  12. Roughgarden, T.: The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 67, 341–364 (2003)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  13. Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E.: How bad is selfish routing? J. ACM 49(2), 236–259 (2002)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Sheffy, Y.: Urban Transportation Networks: Equilibrium Analysis with Mathematical Programming Methods. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs (1985)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Wardrop, J.G.: Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research. ICE Proc. Eng. Divisions 1, 325–362 (1952)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Zakharov, V.V., Krylatov, A.Y.: Competitive routing of traffic flows by navigation providers. Autom. Remote Control 7, 179–189 (2016)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

This research is supported by the Russian Fund for Basic Research (projects 16-51-55006, 16-01-00183), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (project 61661136002) and Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Grant (project 20151080397).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Vladimir V. Mazalov .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Lien, J.W., Mazalov, V.V., Melnik, A.V., Zheng, J. (2016). Wardrop Equilibrium for Networks with the BPR Latency Function. In: Kochetov, Y., Khachay, M., Beresnev, V., Nurminski, E., Pardalos, P. (eds) Discrete Optimization and Operations Research. DOOR 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9869. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44914-2_4

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44914-2_4

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-44913-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-44914-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics