Abstract
We present a formal model for domain pseudonymous signatures – in particular providing a simple and strong concept and comprehensive formalization of unlinkability, which is the key property of domain pseudonymous signatures. Following the approach deployed for German personal identity cards, we consider domains that have to be registered and require a particular form of domain specifications. We introduce and formalize the deanonymization procedures that have to be implemented as one of the crucial functionalities in many application areas of domain signatures. Finally, we present two constructions that correspond to this model.
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Notes
- 1.
The most notable issues with the security model from [1] is the fact that according to their unlinkability definition every adversary may win the game, thus there cannot exists a scheme which would securely implement such model.
- 2.
- 3.
If we go into details and wish to model the situation where some of the parties of the domain creator are controlled by the adversary, we would have to adjust the oracles accordingly.
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This research was supported by National Research Center grant OPUS no 2014/15/B/ST6 /02837.
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Kluczniak, K., Hanzlik, L., Kutyłowski, M. (2016). A Formal Concept of Domain Pseudonymous Signatures. In: Bao, F., Chen, L., Deng, R., Wang, G. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10060. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49151-6_17
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