Abstract
In the near future, connected vehicles are expected to offer the commuters even more convenience and self-autonomy, but at the same time be exposed to much more attacks. A particularly insidious threat to vehicles security is that an attacker may exploit the vulnerabilities of in-vehicle communication network to attack vehicles, such as spoofing CAN bus messages. In this paper, we are thus motivated to propose a solution for achieving authenticated CAN communications, towards ameliorating the threats faced by the in-vehicle communication network. Strictly aiming for practicality and acceptance by the industry, our solution has two salient features: (1) it relies on the industry-wide recognized in-vehicle communication architecture, without requiring addition of any extra hardware; (2) it makes use of standardized cryptographic techniques, without invoking any proprietary cryptographic primitives and mechanisms.
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Acknowledgments
This work is supported by National Natural Science Funds of China (Grant No. 61402199) and Natural Science Funds of Guangdong (Grant No. 2015A030310017).
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Wei, Z., Yang, Y., Li, T. (2016). Authenticated CAN Communications Using Standardized Cryptographic Techniques. In: Bao, F., Chen, L., Deng, R., Wang, G. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10060. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49151-6_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49151-6_23
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