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Receiver Selective Opening Security from Indistinguishability Obfuscation

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Book cover Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2016 (INDOCRYPT 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10095))

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Abstract

In this paper we study public key encryptions secure against RSO (receiver selective opening) attacks. To do so, we exploit the puncturable property of several existing CCA secure schemes that employs the “all-but-one” technique, use an indistinguishability obfuscator to wrap up the decryption circuit and set the obfuscated circuit as the secret key. Concretely, our first construction is from lossy trapdoor functions; our second construction is a bit encryption from puncturable pseudo-random functions and is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks simultaneously.

This work is Supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (973 project) (No. 2013CB338002), the National Nature Science Foundation of China (No. 61502484, No. 61379137, No. 61572495).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that Nielsen’s bound is only effective for SIM-RSO security; for IND-RSO setting, security for single-message case and multi-message case is equivalent, which can be easily proved via a hybrid argument as that for ordinary IND-CPA security.

  2. 2.

    Note that tNCER is IND-RSO secure, and can achieve SIM-RSO security only if a fake ciphertext can be opened to any message with a secret key efficiently.

  3. 3.

    Similar technique has been used recently in other works [8, 10]. Our work is independent to that.

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Acknowledgments

We are very grateful to anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China

    Dingding Jia, Xianhui Lu & Bao Li

  2. Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center, CAS, Beijing, China

    Dingding Jia, Xianhui Lu & Bao Li

  3. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Dingding Jia, Xianhui Lu & Bao Li

Authors
  1. Dingding Jia
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  2. Xianhui Lu
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Correspondence to Dingding Jia .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Haifa , Haifa, Israel

    Orr Dunkelman

  2. Indraprashtha Institute of Information Technology (IIIT-D), New Delhi, India

    Somitra Kumar Sanadhya

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Jia, D., Lu, X., Li, B. (2016). Receiver Selective Opening Security from Indistinguishability Obfuscation. In: Dunkelman, O., Sanadhya, S. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2016. INDOCRYPT 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10095. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49890-4_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49890-4_22

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