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Apollo – End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting with Recovery from Vote Manipulation

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Book cover Electronic Voting (E-Vote-ID 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10141))

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Abstract

We present security vulnerabilities in the remote voting system Helios. We propose Apollo, a modified version of Helios, which addresses these vulnerabilities and could improve the feasibility of internet voting.

In particular, we note that Apollo does not possess Helios’ major known vulnerability, where a dishonest voting terminal can change the vote after it obtains the voter’s credential. With Apollo-lite, votes not authorized by the voter are detected by the public and prevented from being included in the tally.

The full version of Apollo enables a voter to prove that her vote was changed. We also describe a very simple protocol for the voter to interact with any devices she employs to check on the voting system, to enable frequent and easy auditing of encryptions and checking of the bulletin board.

This material is based upon work supported in part by the Maryland Procurement Office under contract H98230-14-C-0127 and NSF Award CNS 1421373.

Authors were partially supported by Polish National Science Centre contract number DEC-2013/09/D/ST6/03927.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Apollo is designed so that the terminal cannot tell whether \(n=0\) or \(n >0\).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C., USA

    Poorvi L. Vora & Hua Wu

  2. Department of Computer Science, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Wrocław, Poland

    Dawid Gaweł, Maciej Kosarzecki & Filip Zagórski

Authors
  1. Dawid Gaweł
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  2. Maciej Kosarzecki
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  3. Poorvi L. Vora
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  4. Hua Wu
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  5. Filip Zagórski
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Filip Zagórski .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia

    Robert Krimmer

  2. Karlstad University, Karlstad, Sweden

    Melanie Volkamer

  3. EVOL2-eVoting Research Lab, Tarragona, Spain

    Jordi Barrat

  4. Microsoft Research, Seattle, USA

    Josh Benaloh

  5. University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

    Nicole Goodman

  6. University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

    Peter Y. A. Ryan

  7. University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia

    Vanessa Teague

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Gaweł, D., Kosarzecki, M., Vora, P.L., Wu, H., Zagórski, F. (2017). Apollo – End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting with Recovery from Vote Manipulation. In: Krimmer, R., et al. Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10141. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52240-1_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52240-1_8

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-52239-5

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