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International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation

GDN 2016: Group Decision and Negotiation. Theory, Empirical Evidence, and Application pp 89–100Cite as

Bargaining Power – Measuring it’s Drivers and Consequences in Negotiations

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing ((LNBIP,volume 274))

Abstract

In this study, the authors carried out a laboratory experiment with professionals of purchasing departments and examined the effects of negotiation power on the outcome of distributive bargaining. The participants took over the role of buyers and sellers alternatively. Power was operationalized in terms of BATNA, time pressure, asymmetric information and self-constraint based on the different theoretical concepts of power applied in social sciences. The results support the influence of the individual factors as predicted by theory to a very large extent. Especially BATNA, time preferences and information differences have a great influence on negotiation outcomes. Hence, the main purpose of the present paper is to develop a basis for a more consistent operationalization of drivers of bargaining power and its influence on negotiation performance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As part of the executive education program the participants were between 20 and 50 years old. Mainly German participants, but a certain percentage had a foreign background (French, English, Persian, Sri Lanka, American, South African). With regard to the educational background the groups were also mixed starting from people with a formal job training and ending with people with a Master degree. In each experiment the participants negotiated with a different participant in every round. The assignment was completely random with regard to demographic characteristics.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. bbw University of Applied Sciences, Leibnizstrasse 11-13, 10625, Berlin, Germany

    Tilman Eichstädt

  2. University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser Str. 63, 99089, Erfurt, Germany

    Ali Hotait

  3. HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Jahnallee 59, 04109, Leipzig, Germany

    Niklas Dahlen

Authors
  1. Tilman Eichstädt
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  2. Ali Hotait
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  3. Niklas Dahlen
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ali Hotait .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington, USA

    Deepinder Bajwa

  2. TU Wien, Vienna, Austria

    Sabine T. Koeszegi

  3. University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    Rudolf Vetschera

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Eichstädt, T., Hotait, A., Dahlen, N. (2017). Bargaining Power – Measuring it’s Drivers and Consequences in Negotiations. In: Bajwa, D., Koeszegi, S., Vetschera, R. (eds) Group Decision and Negotiation. Theory, Empirical Evidence, and Application. GDN 2016. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 274. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52624-9_7

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