Abstract
SPECK is a new family of lightweight block ciphers proposed by the U.S. National Security Agency in 2013. So far, there exist several fault analysis results on this family. In this paper, we propose an improved fault analysis on SPECK under the random byte fault model, which only needs to induce faults at one intermediate round to retrieve the whole master key. In this attack, the fault propagation properties of SPECK are fully utilized, not only to determine the locations and the values of the faults, but also to eliminate incorrect candidates of the key. Moreover, compared with the previous approaches, more characteristics of the nonlinear modular addition operation are exploited, and the relations between different pairs of ciphertexts are also taken into account, which greatly enhance the efficiency of the key recovery. Finally, the experimental results confirm the correctness and the effectiveness of our proposed attack.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for providing valuable comments. This work is supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (973 Program, No.2013CB338002).
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Feng, J., Chen, H., Gao, S., Fan, L., Feng, D. (2017). Improved Fault Analysis on the Block Cipher SPECK by Injecting Faults in the Same Round. In: Hong, S., Park, J. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2016. ICISC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10157. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53177-9_17
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