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One-Round Cross-Domain Group Key Exchange Protocol in the Standard Model

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Information Security and Cryptology (Inscrypt 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10143))

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Abstract

Cross-domain group key exchange protocols enable participants from different domains, even with various cryptographic settings and system parameters, to establish a common secret session key. In prior cross-domain key exchange works, only the case of two communication parties is considered, and the two parties are required to adopt a common cryptographic setting (e.g., identity-based setting) or shared parameters (e.g., algebraic group), which is not suitable for group data sharing in many cross-domain interoperability scenarios. In this paper, we present the first one-round cross-domain group key exchange protocol, and by using indistinguishability obfuscation as the main tool, we prove our construction can achieve the desired security properties in the standard model. It is especially attractive for our protocol that existing PKIs can be used and all participants do not have to accommodate any other peers (even do not need to know other peers’ algebraic settings) to agree on the session key.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Boneh and Waters’s construction for the class of circuit-constrained PRFs [29] is based on the multilinear maps, however, to the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any negative result on its security, and the attack [24] on multilinear maps is not applicable to it.

  2. 2.

    Since our protocol is universal, the concrete computation & communication complexity relies on the instantiated schemes, and we omit it in the comparison.

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Acknowledgments

We want to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments which helped to improve the paper. This work was supported by the National Grand Fundamental Research (973) Program of China under Grant 2013CB338003, and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) under Grants U1536205 and 61572485.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Xiao Lan

  2. Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Jing Xu & Zhenfeng Zhang

  3. State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, Beijing, China

    Hui Guo

  4. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Xiao Lan

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  1. Xiao Lan
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  4. Zhenfeng Zhang
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jing Xu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Science, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou, China

    Kefei Chen

  2. Institute of Information Engineering, SKLOIS, Beijing, China

    Dongdai Lin

  3. Snapchat Inc., Columbia University, New York, New York, USA

    Moti Yung

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Lan, X., Xu, J., Guo, H., Zhang, Z. (2017). One-Round Cross-Domain Group Key Exchange Protocol in the Standard Model. In: Chen, K., Lin, D., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10143. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54705-3_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54705-3_24

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