Abstract
We use agent-based simulation to investigate the interplay between the acquisition and transmission of cultural traits, the dynamics of social network structure and the emergence of meaningful signs. We assume agents in our model must cooperate to thrive in their environment and to be successful in doing so, they must synchronize their otherwise selectively-neutral strategies. We further assume that maintenance of social ties is costly, and that agents cannot directly identify the strategies of their counterparts. We show that when cooperation is biased by the possession of arbitrary observable markers, evolutionary dynamics lead to small-world social structures with communities defined by shared culture and the establishment of markers as signs of community membership.
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Notes
- 1.
We have not observed significant effects of changing the average degree, and therefore do not show figures including this parameter.
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Revay, P., Cioffi-Revilla, C. (2017). Modeling the Co-evolution of Culture, Signs and Network Structure. In: Lee, D., Lin, YR., Osgood, N., Thomson, R. (eds) Social, Cultural, and Behavioral Modeling. SBP-BRiMS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10354. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60240-0_20
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