Abstract
Today, the majority of distributed system users are not systems programmers, nor do they aspire to be. The problem with existing access control mechanisms is not that they don’t work, it is that users despise them and will not interact with them in the way the security model requires. We argue that this is not primarily a user-education issue; instead the user interface needs to be re-factored in a way that will involve a radical change to the way security is modelled.
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Thus meeting Roger Needham’s definition of optimization as replacing something good that works by something better that almost works.
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It seems, however, that in this case card issuers may be attempting to pass some of the cost of this risk on to the cardholder, as the latter is charged for these transactions until and unless they identify them on their statements and inform the issuer [6].
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Suitable mechanisms for this are provided, although not described in these terms, by Chuang and Wernick [3].
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A claim corresponds to a case where the access is subsequently determined to have been unauthorized.
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If two non-identical binary access control policies are jointly enforced then, for some query, conflicting outcomes (‘allow’ and ‘deny’) must be combined. Usually this combination is interpreted as ‘deny’ which, as indicated above, can be problematic.
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Wernick, P., Christianson, B. (2017). The Price of Belief: Insuring Credible Trust?. In: Anderson, J., Matyáš, V., Christianson, B., Stajano, F. (eds) Security Protocols XXIV. Security Protocols 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10368. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62033-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62033-6_5
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