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A Priori Modeling of Information and Intelligence

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Abstract

This paper details primitive structural traits in information, and then in intelligence, as a model of ‘thinking like nature’ (natural/core informatics). It explores the task of designing a general adaptive intelligence from a low-order (non-anthropic) base, to arrive at a scalable, least-ambiguous, and most-general, computational/developmental core.

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Correspondence to Marcus Abundis .

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Appendix: Supplementary Material

Appendix: Supplementary Material

The video and papers listed here provided added detail on the above step-wise analysis.

Title: THE ‘HARD PROBLEM’ OF CONSCIOUSNESS — names flaws in one of the more popular/well-known philosophical views, from among the many philosophical views noted in the first paragraph of Sect. 2.

Link: https://issuu.com/mabundis/docs/hardproblem.

Abstract: To frame any meaningful model of information, intelligence, ‘consciousness’, or the like, one must address a claimed Hard Problem (Chalmers, 1996) — the idea that such phenomenal roles fall beyond scientific views. While the Hard Problem’s veracity is often debated, basic analogues to this claim still appear elsewhere in the literature as a ‘symbol grounding problem’ (Harnad, 1990), ‘solving intelligence’ (Burton-Hill, 2016), Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) ‘theory of meaning’, etc. As such, the ‘issue of phenomena’ or innate subjectivity continues to hold sway in many circles as being unresolved. Also, direct analysis of the Hard Problem seems rare, where researchers instead typically offer related-claims asserting that: (1) it is a patently absurd view unworthy of study, or (2) it presents a fully intractable issue defying clear exploration, but with little clarifying detail. Debate on ‘the claim’ thus endures while clarity remains absent. This essay takes a third approach, that of directly assessing the Hard Problem’s assertion contra natural selection in the formation of human consciousness. It examines Chalmers’s logic and evidence for this view, taken from his articles over the years. The aim is to set an initial base where it then becomes possible to attempt resolution of the aforementioned ‘issue of phenomena’ (8 pages: 4,000 words).

Title: ONE PROBLEM - ONE THOUSAND FACES: IS4IS 2015 (International Society for Information Studies, conference presentation) — gives a broad abstract view of the model’s basic approach, and further details the first bullet point in the step-wise model (Sect. 3) above.

Link: https://vimeo.com/140744119.

Abstract: This video (23 min) gives a broad view of a priori notions of information. It names an initial general ‘theory of meaning’ and ‘theory of information’ that emphasize scalable primitive subjective and objective facets. In brief, the model synthesizes Shannon entropy, Bateson’s different differences, and Darwinian selection (an S-B-D model) to derive meaningful information across diverse disciplines. In the video: Basic issues and questions are framed (2:30 min). Known meaningful metadata traits are detailed (2:30 min). Next, metadata’s role is fully deconstructed in remaining minutes to name universal a priori facets. Lastly, the model is re-constituted ‘from the ground up’ to present a fully synthesized S-B-D a priori view. Text for the video voice-over can also be read or downloaded at: http://issuu.com/mabundis/docs/oneprob.fin

Title: A GENERAL THEORY OF MEANING: Modeling informational fundaments — details the second bullet point in Sect. 3.

Link: https://issuu.com/mabundis/docs/abundis.tom.

Abstract: This essay targets a meaningful void in information theory, as named by Shannon and Weaver (1949). It explores current science (i.e., the standard model in physics, the periodic table, etc.) in relation to information and consciousness. It develops a ‘bridge’ to join these topics by framing meaningful information, or a ‘natural/core informatics’. The study posits a general theory of meaning, where three types of informational meaning are detailed. As such, the model uses type theory to re-frame classic conflicts that arise across diverse informational roles, with Bateson-like (1979) ‘differentiated differences’ (or types) as informational fundaments (12 pages; 5,700 words).

Title: NATURAL MULTI-STATE COMPUTING - Engineering evolution: Simple machines and beyond — supports the third bullet point in Sect. 3.

Link: https://issuu.com/mabundis/docs/multistate.

Abstract: This essay covers adaptive logic in humans and other agents, and complements a related ‘general theory of meaning’ (Abundis, 2016). It names informational roles needed for minimal adaptivity as a direct experience, versus the ‘reasoning by analogy’ typical of artificial intelligence. It shows how levers, as a computational trope (adaptive template), typify meaningful adaptive traits for many agents and later afford the advent of simple machines. To develop the model: (1) Three lever classes are shown to compel a natural informatics in diverse agents. (2) Those lever classes are next deconstructed to derive a ‘scalable creativity’. (3) That creative logic is then detailed as holding three entropically generative computational roles. (4) Lastly, that adaptive logic is used to model tool creation. Thus, the analysis frames systemic creativity (natural disruptions and evolution) in various roles (discrete, continuous, and bifurcations) for many agents, on diverse levels, to depict a ‘general adaptive intelligence’ (16 pages; 6,600 words).

Title: SELECTION DYNAMICS AS AS ORIGIN OF REASON: Causes of cognitive information - a path to ‘Super-Intelligence’ — covers the fourth bullet point in Sect. 3.

Link: https://issuu.com/mabundis/docs/lgcn.fin.4.15.

Abstract: This study explores ‘adaptive cognition’ in relation to agents striving to abide entropic forces (natural selection). It enlarges on a view of Shannon (1948) information theory and a ‘theory of meaning’ (Abundis, 2016) developed elsewhere. The analysis starts by pairing classic selection pressure (purifying, divisive, and directional selection) and agent acts (as flight, freeze, and fight responses), to frame a basic model. It next details ensuing environs-agent exchanges as marking Selection Dynamics, for a ‘general adaptive model’. Selection Dynamics are then shown in relation to chaos theory, and a fractal-like topology, for an initial computational view. Lastly, the resulting dualist-triune topology is detailed as sustaining many evolutionary and cognitive roles, thus marking an extensible adaptive informational/cultural fundament (13 pages: 5,700 words).

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Abundis, M. (2017). A Priori Modeling of Information and Intelligence. In: Everitt, T., Goertzel, B., Potapov, A. (eds) Artificial General Intelligence. AGI 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10414. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63703-7_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63703-7_25

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