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Subscriber Profile Extraction and Modification via Diameter Interconnection

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10394))

Abstract

The interconnection network (IPX) connects telecommunication networks with each other. The IPX network enables features like roaming and data access while traveling. Designed as a closed network it is now opening up and unauthorized entities now misuse the IPX network for their purposes. The majority of the IPX still runs the Signaling System No. 7 (SS7) protocol stack, while the more advanced operators now turn towards Diameter based LTE roaming. SS7 is known to suffer from many attacks. The first attacks for Diameter are known. In this article, we will show how an attacker can deduct a subscriber profile from the Home Subscriber Service (HSS). The subscriber profile contains all key information related to the users’ subscription e.g. location, billing information etc. We will close with a recommendation how to prevent such an attack.

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References

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Acknowledgments

This work was made under the DIMECC Cyber Trust Program (Finland). We would also like to thank the security aware operators in GSMA which drive the improvement of the interconnection security.

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Correspondence to Silke Holtmanns .

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Holtmanns, S., Miche, Y., Oliver, I. (2017). Subscriber Profile Extraction and Modification via Diameter Interconnection. In: Yan, Z., Molva, R., Mazurczyk, W., Kantola, R. (eds) Network and System Security. NSS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10394. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64701-2_45

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64701-2_45

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-64701-2

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