Abstract
We present the voting protocol Eos that is based on a conditional linkable ring signatures scheme. Voters are organized in rings allowing them to sign votes anonymously. Voters may assume multiple pseudo identities, one of which is legitimate. We use the others to signal coercion to the Election Authority. Eos uses two mixing phases with the goal to break the connection between the voter and vote, not to preserve vote privacy (which is given already) but to guarantee coercion resistance by making it (nearly) impossible for a coercer to follow their vote through the bulletin board. Eos is universally verifiable.
C. Schurmann—This work was funded in part through the Danish Council for Strategic Research, Programme Comission on Strategic Growth Technologies under grant 10-092309. This publication was also made possible by NPRP grant NPRP 7-988-1-178 from the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation). The statements made herein are solely the responsibility of the authors.
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Patachi, Ş., Schürmann, C. (2017). Eos a Universal Verifiable and Coercion Resistant Voting Protocol. In: Krimmer, R., Volkamer, M., Braun Binder, N., Kersting, N., Pereira, O., Schürmann, C. (eds) Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10615. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68687-5_13
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