Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Differential Cryptanalysis of 18-Round PRIDE

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Book cover Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2017 (INDOCRYPT 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10698))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

The rapid growth of the Internet of Things together with the increasing popularity of connected objects have created a need for secure, efficient and lightweight ciphers. Among the multitude of candidates, the block cipher PRIDE is, to this day, one of the most efficient solutions for 8-bit micro-controllers. In this paper, we provide new insights and a better understanding of differential attacks of PRIDE. First, we show that two previous attacks are incorrect, and describe (new and old) properties of the cipher that make such attacks intricate. Based on this understanding, we show how to properly mount a differential attack. Our proposal is the first single key differential attack that reaches 18 rounds out of 20. It requires \(2^{61}\) chosen plaintexts and recovers the 128-bit key with a final time complexity of \(2^{63.3}\) encryptions, while requiring a memory of about \(2^{35}\) blocks of 64 bits.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Sect. 5.5 of [1].

  2. 2.

    Due to space limitations, we refer to [1] for the details of the linear layer.

  3. 3.

    Note that simple relations can also be found between other keys; \(K_i\) and \(K_{i+16}\) for instance.

  4. 4.

    It corresponds to what we name in next section the first characteristic of type (I, a), see Table 5.

  5. 5.

    The fourth characteristic of type (II, a) given in Table 5.

  6. 6.

    Here we look at real values instead of truncated differences.

  7. 7.

    Our experiments for up to 7 rounds showed that the probability of the differential matches the one of the characteristic.

  8. 8.

    The computation of the quantities used in this step are detailed in the full version of the paper [10].

  9. 9.

    \(2^{17.38} \cdot (16 \cdot 2^{-17.38}) = 2^4\).

References

  1. Albrecht, M.R., Driessen, B., Kavun, E.B., Leander, G., Paar, C., Yalçın, T.: Block ciphers – focus on the linear layer (feat. PRIDE). In: Garay, J.A., Gennaro, R. (eds.) CRYPTO 2014. LNCS, vol. 8616, pp. 57–76. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44371-2_4

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Beaulieu, R., Shors, D., Smith, J., Treatman-Clark, S., Weeks, B., Wingers, L.: The SIMON and SPECK lightweight block ciphers. In: Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Design Automation Conference, 2015, pp. 175:1–175:6. ACM (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Dai, Y., Chen, S.: Cryptanalysis of full PRIDE block cipher. Sci. China Inf. Sci. 60(5), 052108:1–052108:12 (2017)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  4. Dinur, I.: Cryptanalytic time-memory-data tradeoffs for FX-constructions with applications to PRINCE and PRIDE. In: Oswald, E., Fischlin, M. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9056, pp. 231–253. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46800-5_10

    Google Scholar 

  5. Gong, Z., Nikova, S., Law, Y.W.: KLEIN: a new family of lightweight block ciphers. In: Juels, A., Paar, C. (eds.) RFIDSec 2011. LNCS, vol. 7055, pp. 1–18. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25286-0_1

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Guo, J., Jean, J., Mouha, N., Nikolic, I.: More Rounds, Less Security? IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2015, 484 (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Karakoç, F., Demirci, H., Harmancı, A.E.: ITUbee: a software oriented lightweight block cipher. In: Avoine, G., Kara, O. (eds.) LightSec 2013. LNCS, vol. 8162, pp. 16–27. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40392-7_2

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Kilian, J., Rogaway, P.: How to protect DES against exhaustive key search (an analysis of DESX). J. Cryptol. 14(1), 17–35 (2001)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  9. Lac, B., Beunardeau, M., Canteaut, A., Fournier, J.J., Sirdey, R.: A First DFA on PRIDE: from Theory to Practice (extended version). IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2017, 075 (2017)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Lallemand, V., Rasoolzadeh, S.: Differential cryptanalysis of 18-round PRIDE. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2017, 1017 (2017)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Standaert, F.-X., Piret, G., Gershenfeld, N., Quisquater, J.-J.: SEA: a scalable encryption algorithm for small embedded applications. In: Domingo-Ferrer, J., Posegga, J., Schreckling, D. (eds.) CARDIS 2006. LNCS, vol. 3928, pp. 222–236. Springer, Heidelberg (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/11733447_16

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Tezcan, C.: Improbable differential attacks on present using undisturbed bits. J. Comput. Appl. Math. 259, 503–511 (2014)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  13. Tezcan, C., Okan, G.O., Şenol, A., Doğan, E., Yücebaş, F., Baykal, N.: Differential attacks on lightweight block ciphers PRESENT, PRIDE, and RECTANGLE revisited. In: Bogdanov, A. (ed.) LightSec 2016. LNCS, vol. 10098, pp. 18–32. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55714-4_2

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. Tezcan, C., Özbudak, F.: Differential factors: improved attacks on SERPENT. In: Eisenbarth, T., Öztürk, E. (eds.) LightSec 2014. LNCS, vol. 8898, pp. 69–84. Springer, Cham (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16363-5_5

    Google Scholar 

  15. Yang, Q., Hu, L., Sun, S., Qiao, K., Song, L., Shan, J., Ma, X.: Improved differential analysis of block cipher PRIDE. In: Lopez, J., Wu, Y. (eds.) ISPEC 2015. LNCS, vol. 9065, pp. 209–219. Springer, Cham (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17533-1_15

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  16. Zhao, J., Wang, X., Wang, M., Dong, X.: Differential Analysis on Block Cipher PRIDE. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2014, 525 (2014)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Virginie Lallemand & Shahram Rasoolzadeh

Authors
  1. Virginie Lallemand
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Shahram Rasoolzadeh
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Shahram Rasoolzadeh .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru, India

    Arpita Patra

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom

    Nigel P. Smart

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Lallemand, V., Rasoolzadeh, S. (2017). Differential Cryptanalysis of 18-Round PRIDE. In: Patra, A., Smart, N. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2017. INDOCRYPT 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10698. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71667-1_7

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71667-1_7

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-71666-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-71667-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation