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Human-on-the-Loop Automation for Detecting Software Side-Channel Vulnerabilities

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Information Systems Security (ICISS 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10717))

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Abstract

Software side-channel vulnerabilities (SSCVs) allow an attacker to gather secrets by observing the differential in the time or space required for executing the program for different inputs. Detecting SSCVs is like searching for a needle in the haystack, not knowing what the needle looks like. Detecting SSCVs requires automation that supports systematic exploration to identify vulnerable code, formulation of plausible side-channel hypotheses, and gathering evidence to prove or refute each hypothesis. This paper describes human-on-the-loop automation to empower analysts to detect SSCVs. The proposed automation is founded on novel ideas for canonical side channel patterns, program artifact filters, and parameterized program graph models for efficient, accurate, and interactive program analyses. The detection process is exemplified through a case study. The paper also presents metrics that bring out the complexity of detecting SSCVs.

This material is based on research sponsored by DARPA under agreement numbers FA8750-15-2-0080 and FA8750-12-2-0126. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of DARPA or the U.S. Government.

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Acknowledgements

We thank our colleagues from Iowa State University and EnSoft for their help with this paper. Dr. Kothari is the founder President and a financial stakeholder in EnSoft.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Iowa State University, Ames, IA, 50011, USA

    Ganesh Ram Santhanam, Benjamin Holland & Suresh Kothari

  2. Ensoft Corp., Ames, IA, 50010, USA

    Nikhil Ranade

Authors
  1. Ganesh Ram Santhanam
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  2. Benjamin Holland
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  3. Suresh Kothari
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  4. Nikhil Ranade
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ganesh Ram Santhanam .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, India

    Rudrapatna K. Shyamasundar

  2. Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, India

    Virendra Singh

  3. Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey, USA

    Jaideep Vaidya

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Santhanam, G.R., Holland, B., Kothari, S., Ranade, N. (2017). Human-on-the-Loop Automation for Detecting Software Side-Channel Vulnerabilities. In: Shyamasundar, R., Singh, V., Vaidya, J. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10717. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72598-7_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72598-7_13

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