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An Auction Framework for DaaS in Cloud Computing

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Advances in Internet, Data & Web Technologies (EIDWT 2018)

Abstract

Data as a Service (DaaS) is the next emerging technology in cloud computing research. Small clouds operating as a group may exploit the DaaS efficiently to perform substantial amount of work. In this paper an auction framework is studied when the small clouds are strategic in nature. We present the system model and formal definition of the problem. Several auction DaaS-based mechanisms are proposed and their correctness and computational complexity analysed. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first and realistic attempt to study the DaaS in strategic setting.

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Acknowledgements

We acknowledge all the departmental faculty members and research scholars for inspiring us. Supported by the PhD scholarship provided in the Visvesvaraya Scheme.

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Correspondence to Anjan Bandyopadhyay .

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Bandyopadhyay, A., Xhafa, F., Mukhopadhyay, S. (2018). An Auction Framework for DaaS in Cloud Computing. In: Barolli, L., Xhafa, F., Javaid, N., Spaho, E., Kolici, V. (eds) Advances in Internet, Data & Web Technologies. EIDWT 2018. Lecture Notes on Data Engineering and Communications Technologies, vol 17. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75928-9_65

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75928-9_65

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75927-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-75928-9

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