Abstract
The client-server architecture is one of the most widely used in the Internet for its simplicity and flexibility. In practice the server is assigned a public address so that its services can be consumed. This makes the server vulnerable to a number of attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), censorship from authoritarian governments or exploitation of software vulnerabilities.
In this work we propose an asynchronous protocol for allowing a client to issue requests to a server without revealing any information about the location of the server. In addition, our solution reveals limited information about the network topology, leaking only the distance from the client to the corrupted participants.
We also provide a simulation-based security definition capturing the requirement described above. Our protocol is secure in the semi-honest model against any number of colluding participants, and has linear communication complexity.
Finally, we extend our solution to handle active adversaries. We show that malicious participants can only trigger a premature termination of the protocol, in which case they are identified. For this solution the communication complexity becomes quadratic.
To the best of our knowledge our solution is the first asynchronous protocol that provides strong security guarantees.
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Notes
- 1.
Which we borrow from Dolev and Ostrovsky [10].
- 2.
The network functionality of [21] is rather different in the sense that all participant call it at same time, and all have message to all its neighbors.
- 3.
Note that messages needs to be forwarded once – and only once– to neighbors, even when the message has arrived to its destination.
- 4.
Changing at each hybrid step the honest participant updated shares in the \(\mathtt {to\_requester\_UP}\) messages from the ideal distribution to the corresponding ciphertext on the real distribution. Note that the fact we are in the multi-user setting (a message is encrypted under two different public keys) can be reduced to the single-user setting (standard IND-CPA security definition) [23].
- 5.
Otherwise the adversary would be able to perform eclipse attacks [25] on some subset(s) of honest nodes which would yield honest nodes to be tagged as malicious.
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Acknowledgments
We appreciate the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. We would also like to thank Marijn Vriens (Dreamlab Technologies AG) and Stefano Debenedetti (Dreamlab Technologies AG) for thoughtful discussions regarding the deployment of the protocol in real world environments, and Cyel AG in Switzerland for the commercial partnership.
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Camacho, P., Krell, F. (2018). Asynchronous Provably-Secure Hidden Services. In: Smart, N. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2018. CT-RSA 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10808. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76953-0_10
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